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Abstract
We study identification and inference in first-price auctions with risk averse bidders and
selective entry, building on a flexible entry and bidding framework we call the Affiliated
Signal with Risk Aversion (AS-RA) model. Assuming that the econometrician observes either
exogenous variation in the number of potential bidders (N ) or a continuous instrument (z)
shifting opportunity costs of entry, we provide a sharp characterization of the nonparametric
restrictions implied by equilibrium bidding. Given variation in either competition or costs,
this characterization implies that risk neutrality is nonparametrically testable in the sense
that if bidders are strictly risk averse, then no risk neutral model can rationalize the data.
In addition, if both instruments (discrete N and continuous z) are available, then the model
primitives are nonparametrically point identified. We then explore inference based on these
identification results, focusing on set inference and testing when primitives are set identified.
Keywords: Auctions, entry, risk aversion, identification, set inference.
JEL Classifications: D44, C57.
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Introduction

Risk aversion and entry are both important considerations in real-world auction markets.
While much empirical research has documented these factors individually, relatively little
work has explored how they interact. This is at least in part because this interaction also
raises a significant empirical challenge: selection into entry may undermine the exclusion
∗
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restrictions necessary for identification of risk preferences. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of identification in first price auctions with risk averse bidders and selective
entry. We then explore inference based on these identification results, extending recent results of Chen, Christensen, and Tamer (2018) to construct confidence sets for identified sets
when primitives are possibly set-identified.
Bidder risk attitutes are of fundamental importance in auction design—affecting, among
other things, the revenue ranking between first-price and ascending auctions (Maskin and
Riley (1984)), the structure of the optimal mechanism (Matthews (1987)), and whether the
seller should disclose reserve prices (Li and Tan (2000)). Motivated by this fact, a substantial
empirical literature has arisen on bidder risk preferences, finding evidence for risk aversion in
a variety of real-world contexts, including in settings where bidders are firms. For instance,
Baldwin (1995) and Athey and Levin (2001) find that bidding firms diversify risk across
species in U.S. Forest Service timber auctions, Ackerberg, Hirano, and Shahriar (2017) show
that bidder risk aversion rationalizes the use of buy-it-now options in eBay auctions, and
Bajari and Hortacsu (2005) find that risk aversion explains bidder behavior in experiments.
Meanwhile, using more structural approaches, Lu and Perrigne (2008) and Campo, Guerre,
Perrigne, and Vuong (2011) find evidence for risk aversion in U.S. Forest Service timber
auctions, while Kong (2019) finds that risk aversion can explain observed revenue differences
between first-price and ascending auctions for oil and gas leases in New Mexico.1
A similarly substantial body of empirical research has also documented the prevalence of
endogenous entry in real-world auction markets.2 While this literature has evolved largely
in parallel to the literature on risk aversion cited above, the conjunction between risk aversion and entry also raises important economic questions. For instance, Smith and Levin
(1996) show that in environments with both risk aversion and entry, second-price auctions
1

Findings of risk aversion in timber, oil and gas auctions are of particular interest as the players in both markets
are firms. We view such findings as consistent with the hypothesis that, even within firms, all bidding is ultimately
done by individuals. Hence, as usual in principle-agent models, the risk preferences of the bidding agents will
typically be relevant even if one presumes that the firm itself is risk neutral.
2
For instance, Hendricks, Pinkse, and Porter (2003) report that less than 25 percent of eligible bidders participate
in U.S. Minerals Management Service “wildcat auctions” held from 1954 to 1970. Li and Zheng (2009) find that
only about 28 percent of planholders in Texas Department of Transportation mowing contracts actually submit
bids. Similar patterns have been reported for timber auctions (Athey, Levin, and Seira (2011), Li and Zhang
(2010, 2015), Roberts and Sweeting (2013)), online auctions (Bajari and Hortacsu (2003)), highway procurement
(Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), Bhattacharya, Roberts, and Sweeting (2014)) and corporate takeover markets
(Gentry and Stroup (2019)) among others.
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can yield higher revenue than first-price auctions, contradicting the usual revenue ranking
(Maskin and Riley (1984)) which obtains with risk aversion alone.3 Answers to many other
policy questions—such as how the seller should regulate participation, or whether the seller
should disclose the number of entrants—will similarly depend on the interaction between risk
aversion and entry.
Econometrically, however, the interaction between risk aversion and entry also raises
substantial challenges for identification and inference, particularly in settings where entry
is potentially selective (Samuelson (1985), Ye (2007), Marmer, Shneyerov, and Xu (2013),
Gentry and Li (2014), Roberts and Sweeting (2013)). Existing results on nonparametric
point identification in auctions with risk averse bidders assume that the latent distribution
of bidder valuations is invariant either to the seller’s choice of auction format (Lu and Perrigne
(2008)), or to the set of competitors faced (Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2009)). But as
shown by Li, Lu, and Zhao (2015), if risk averse bidders select into entry, the distribution
of valuations among entrants will respond endogenously to both the auction format and the
strength of competition faced. Hence both invariance assumptions typically fail in settings
with selective entry, rendering identification of risk preferences correspondingly uncertain.
Motivated by these observations, we study identification and inference in first-price auctions with risk averse bidders and selective entry, building on a framework we call the Affiliated Signal with Risk Aversion (AS-RA) model. First proposed by Li, Lu, and Zhao (2015)
(henceforth LLZ), this model considers a set of N symmetric potential bidders with wealth
preferences described by a smooth concave Bernoulli utility function U , who compete in a
first-price auction with entry. Potential bidders have independent private values, observe
signals of their values prior to entry, and choose whether to incur a common-knowledge
entry cost, with entrants learning their values and submitting bids. This framework nests
many existing models as special cases, including the affiliated-signal (AS) models of Marmer,
Shneyerov, and Xu (2013) and Gentry and Li (2014) (henceforth GL); the mixed-strategy
entry model of Levin and Smith (1994); and models with risk averse bidders but exogenous
entry including Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2009) (henceforth GPV), Campo, Guerre,
Perrigne, and Vuong (2011) (henceforth CGPV) and Zincenko (2018). It thus represents a
3

Less surprisingly, but also worth noting, this result also contrasts with revenue equivalence when bidders enter
endogenously but are risk neutral (e.g. Levin and Smith (1994), Gentry, Li, and Lu (2017)).
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natural focal point for researchers seeking to understand structural interactions between risk
aversion and entry.
This paper makes two main contributions. First, we develop a suite of results on nonparametric and semiparametric identification of AS-RA model primitives based on variation
either in the number of potential competitors N or in an instrument z influencing bidders’
opportunity costs of entry. Assuming that neither U nor the ex ante distribution of bidders’
private information depend on realizations of N and z, we provide a sharp characterization of
the set of AS-RA primitives consistent with equilibrium bidding behavior (Theorem 1). This
characterization implies that risk neutrality is nonparametrically testable even with only variation in N , in the strong sense that if bidders are strictly risk averse, then risk neutrality will
be strictly outside the identified set. More generally, if only variation in N is available, primitives will be nonparametrically set identified, while if in addition a continuous instrument
z inducing sufficiently rich entry variation is available, they will be point identified. These
findings generalize prior results on nonparametric identification under either risk aversion
with exogenous entry (GPV (2009)) or risk neutrality with AS entry (GL (2014)). We also
show that the CRRA and CARA utility families imply semiparametric point identification of
U , while a parametric signal-value copula yields conditional identification of AS-RA model
primitives up to the unknown copula parameter.
Second, building on these identification results, we explore a new approach to inference
within set identified auction models based on Chen, Christensen, and Tamer (2018) (henceforth CCT), who develop MCMC methods for inference on identified sets. CCT (2018)’s
methods are ideally suited to our setting, since they accommodate both set identification
of primitives and models in which the support of observables depends on parameters. The
latter allows us to sidestep the well-known problem that in first price auctions the maximum
bid is parameter-dependent, which violates usual regularity conditions for MLE inference
as pointed out by Donald and Paarsch (1993). To operationalize inference based on CCT
(2018), we parameterize bidder utility and distributions of values among entrants within flexible sieve-type families, re-interpreting nonparametric restrictions in Theorem 1 as constraints
on model parameters. We then apply CCT (2018)’s results to develop a simple likelihood
ratio test for risk neutrality, as well as confidence sets for identified sets of parameters. Fi-
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nally, we evaluate the performance of these methods in a simulation study, focusing on a
partially identified setting with variation in N only, with excellent practical results. To our
knowledge, our paper is the first to apply CCT (2018) in an auction context, and we believe
our implementation is also useful in other set-identified auction models.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
analyzes identification. Section 4 explores set inference and Section 5 reports results from a
Monte Carlo exercise. Finally, Section 6 concludes. Appendix A provides additional theoretical details, Appendix B collects technical proofs. Appendix C presents computation details
for set inference.

2

The symmetric AS-RA model

We consider a population of independent first-price auctions, each involving allocation of a
single indivisible good among N (≥ 2) potential bidders via a first-price auction with entry.
The number of potential bidders N varies on the set N ≡ {N1 , ..., NK }, where elements are
ordered such that N1 < N2 < ... < NK , and the subscript k ∈ K ≡ {1, ..., K} indexes levels
of N . For each auction, the econometrician observes the number of potential bidders N , the
number of bidders (entrants) n, and the vector of submitted bids b, as well as an entry instrument z described below. We focus on a symmetric environment with independent private
information, although our main identification insights extend to asymmetric bidders and unobserved auction heterogeneity as in GL (2014). All results extend immediately conditional
on further auction-level covariates X, although for simplicity we suppress these in notation.

2.1

Model overview

We model entry and bidding as a two-stage game with the following timing. First, in Stage
1, each potential bidder i receives a private signal Si of her (unknown) private value Vi , and
all potential bidders simultaneously decide whether to undertake entry at an opportunity
cost c(z) described below. Next, in Stage 2, the n bidders who choose to enter in Stage 1
learn the realizations vi of their private values Vi and submit bids. The Stage 2 mechanism
is a standard first-price auction with non-binding reservation price r = 0, where the highest
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bidder wins and pays her bid.
Value-signal pairs (Vi , Si ) are drawn independently across bidders from a common joint
distribution Fvs (v, s), where higher pre-entry signals are good news in the sense that the distribution of Vi given Si is stochastically increasing in Si . We assume that Vi has a continuous
marginal distribution F with support [0, v̄], where v̄ ∈ (0, ∞). Without loss of generality, we
normalize Stage 1 signals to standard uniform: Si ∼ U [0, 1]. By Sklar’s theorem (see, e.g.,
Nelsen (1999)), we then have Fvs (v, s) = C(F (v), s), where C(a, s) is the unique bivariate
copula describing dependence between Vi and Si .
Conditional on choosing to enter, bidder i incurs an entry cost c(z) > 0, which potentially
depends on an instrument z observable to both bidders and the econometrician. We follow
Lu (2009) in modeling c(z) as a pure opportunity cost of entry, with z interpreted as a factor
affecting the value of opportunities foregone by entry. We assume that the support Z̄ of z is
a closed subset of R, although we allow Z̄ to be a singleton, discrete, or an interval.
Potential bidders are risk averse with risk preferences described by a symmetric, strictly
monotone, weakly concave Bernoulli utility function U (w), where w is post-auction wealth.
Without loss of generality, we normalize U such that U (0) = 0 and U (1) = 1. For simplicity,
we model bidders as having zero initial wealth and zero financial costs of entry. As described
in Appendix A, however, these are in fact equivalent to normalizations in a more general
setting with both nonzero initial wealth and financial (in addition to opportunity) costs of
entry. In this more general case, following LLZ (2015), we interpret U as describing bidder
i’s utility of final wealth, normalized relative to the outcome that i enters the auction but
does not win.
The number of potential competitors N , the entry cost c(z), utility function U , ex ante
value distribution F , and value-signal copula C are known to all potential bidders, with
value-signal realization (vi , si ) being private information revealed to potential bidder i with
timing described above. Although N is common knowledge prior to entry, the number of
entrants (actual bidders) n is revealed to bidders only after the auction concludes.4 In
our view, this informational structure best reflects institutional practices typical in sealed4

In circumstances where known n is considered a preferable assumption, one would condition bidding strategies
on both N and n. This would substantially simplify identification: conditional on N , realizations of n would be
effectively random, allowing for direct application of GPV (2009) identification arguments.
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bid markets, where auctioneer announcements or industry experience convey knowledge of
potential competition but bids are revealed only after the auction concludes.5

2.2

Structural assumptions

In what follows, we refer to (U, F, C, c) as the AS-RA model primitives, and (U, F, C) as the
bid-stage primitives. We shall study identification of the bid-stage primitives of the AS-RA
model based on variation in either N or z, assuming that both factors are excludable in
the sense that true bid-stage primitives, subsequently denoted (U0 , F0 , C0 ), are invariant to
realizations of N and z.
Assumption 1. (U0 , F0 , C0 ) and c(·) satisfy the following conditions:
1. For all N ∈ N and z ∈ Z̄, P r(Vi ≤ v|N, z) = F0 (v) for any v ∈ [0, ∞) and P r(F0 (Vi ) ≤
a, Si ≤ s|N, z) = C0 (a, s) for any (a, s) ∈ [0, 1]2 , and U0 (·) does not depend on N or z.
2. The entry cost function c(z) is strictly increasing in z when Z̄ is not a singleton and
continuous in z when Z̄ is an interval.
Exogenous variation in competition, either actual or potential, has been considered as
a source of variation for testing and identification by many prior studies, including Haile,
Hong, and Shum (2003), GPV (2009), and GL (2014) among others. Exogenous variation
in an entry shifter z follows GL (2014) among others. While, for completeness, we analyze
identification allowing for variation in both N and z, we expect that external instruments z
which are excludable in the (strong) sense required may be challenging to find in practice.6
For this reason, in both identification and inference, we will place particular emphasis on cases
where only variation in N is available (or, equivalently, where Z̄ is a singleton). Importantly,
however, our results extend immediately to settings with asymmetric bidders, in which case
5
For example, in US highway procurement markets, the auctioneer will typically publish a list of planholders
(potential entrants) on each contract prior to the letting date. But only a small fraction of planholders actually
submit bids (Li and Zheng (2009)), and the set of bids received is only disclosed after the letting concludes. We
view such auctions as naturally modeled by the assumption of known N but unknown n. Empirical support for
the assumption of unknown n is provided by Kong (2019), who shows in the context of New Mexico oil and gas
auctions that even when n = 1 the single bidder typically bids well above the reserve. This finding is difficult to
rationalize when n is known, but follows immediately when n is unknown.
6
In Assumption 1, we make implicit use of the fact that z shifts opportunity, rather than financial, costs of
entry: if instead z shifted financial entry costs, then z would affect the normalization of U (·) and one could not
assume that U0 (x) is invariant to z. This interpretation is consistent with the structural AS-RA application of
Kong (2017), in which z measures oil and gas auctions outside the specific region considered. As pointed out by a
referee, however, one may also be concerned that opportunities to bid in other auctions could affect bidder wealth,
in which case z would best be treated as a covariate rather than an instrument.
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types of i’s rivals are also natural candidates for instruments affecting bidder i’s entry but
excludable (in the sense of Assumption 1) with respect to i’s primitives.
In addition to the key exclusion restrictions in Assumption 1, we assume that (U0 , F0 , C0 )
belong to regularity classes defined as follows:
Assumption 2. U0 ∈ U, where U is the set of utility functions U (·) such that:
1. U : [0, ∞) → [0, ∞), U (0) = 0, and U (1) = 1.
2. U (·) is continuous on [0, ∞) and admits three continuous derivatives on (0, ∞), with
U 0 (·) > 0 and U 00 (·) ≤ 0 on (0, ∞).




U (x)
U (x)
d
d2
3. Both limx↓0 dx
and
lim
0
0
x↓0
2
U (x)
U (x) are finite.
dx
Assumption 3. F0 ∈ F, where F is the set of probability distributions F (·) such that:
1. F (·) is supported on a compact interval [0, v̄], with v̄ < ∞.
2. F (·) is twice continuously differentiable with positive density on [0, v̄].
Assumption 4. C0 ∈ C, where C is the set of bivariate copula functions C(a, s) such that,
interpreted as a distribution over random variables (A, S) with uniform marginals:
1. C(a, s) is continuous on [0, 1] × [0, 1].
2. For all s ∈ [0, 1), the distribution of A given S ≥ s admits a continuous, bounded density
with infimum support a(s) continuous in s, and for all points in its support except
possibly the infimum a(s), this density is locally bounded away from zero, differentiable
in a, and differentiable in s.
3. For all a ∈ [0, 1], C(a, s) is concave in s.
Assumptions 2 and 3 impose standard regularity conditions on U0 and F0 , following GPV
(2009) among others. Conditions 1 and 2 of Assumption 4 ensure that regularity conditions
on F0 pass through to selected distributions of Vi given Si ≥ s arising in equilibrium, while
nesting Samuelson (1985)’s model of perfectly selective entry within the class C.7 Finally,
Condition 3 of Assumption 4 is equivalent to assuming that Vi is weakly increasing in Si in
the sense of first-order stochastic dominance; this can be seen most readily when C0 (a, s)
is differentiable, in which case F (v|Si = s) =

∂C0 (F0 (v),s)
.
∂s

We maintain Assumptions 1-4

throughout the analysis.
As in GPV (2009), rather than working with the utility function U0 directly, it will
frequently prove more convenient to use the following one-to-one transformations. Define
λ0 (x) ≡

U0 (x)
,
U00 (x)

and observe that in view of the normalizations above, we have U0 (x) =

7

Formally, this model is nested by setting C(a, s) = min(a, s), in which case C(a, s) does not admit a joint
density but does satisfy the smoothness conditions in Assumption 4, which are sufficient for our results.
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exp

Rx
1

1/λ0 (t) dt. Furthermore, bearing in mind that U0 (0) = 0, U00 > 0, and U000 ≤ 0, we

have λ0 (0) = 0 and λ00 (x) = 1 −

U0 (x) U000 (x)
U00 (x) U00 (x)

≥ 1. It follows that λ0 (·) has a well-defined,

−1,0
−1
monotone inverse λ−1
≤ 1. We will work with U0 , λ0 , and
0 (·) satisfying λ0 (0) = 0 and λ0

λ−1
0 interchangeably, depending on context. Let Λ be the set of functions λ(x) such that
λ(x) ≡ [U (x)/U 0 (x)] for some U ∈ U, and let Λ−1 be the set of functions λ−1 which are
inverses of some function λ ∈ Λ.

2.3

Equilibrium behavior

We focus on the unique symmetric, monotone equilibrium of the AS-RA model. Since the
properties of this equilibrium have already been derived by LLZ (2015), we describe only
its identification-relevant features here. We provide a complete derivation of the properties
stated below, in a more general setting additionally accommodating nonzero initial wealth
and financial costs of entry, in Appendix A.
For each competition level k ∈ K and each opportunity cost level z ∈ Z̄, equilibrium Stage
1 entry will involve a signal threshold sk (z) ∈ [0, 1] such that bidder j enters if and only if
Sj ≥ sk (z). The distribution of valuations among bidders choosing to enter conditional on
observables (Nk , z) will therefore be described by the c.d.f.
Fk0 (v|z) ≡ F (v|Sj ≥ sk (z)) =

F0 (v) − C0 (F0 (v), sk (z))
,
1 − sk (z)

k = 1, ..., K.

(1)

In what follows, let vk (α|z) be the quantile function of the post-entry value distribution
Fk0 (v|z), and v0 (α) be the quantile function of the ex ante value distribution F0 (v). We also
consider the case when Z̄ is a singleton, so that conditioning on z is trivial; in this case we
will simply use Fk0 (v) and vk (α) to denote Fk0 (v|z) and vk (α|z) respectively.
Taking the entry threshold sk (z) as given, post-entry bidding at competition level k ∈ K
will be described by a symmetric, monotone strategy βk (·|z) such that entrant i drawing
valuation vi optimally submits bid βk (vi |z). To characterize this equilibrium strategy, recall
that (at the time of bidding) entrant i is uncertain whether any given potential rival j
has entered. Hence, in equilibrium, entrant i submitting bid βk (y|z) expects to outbid any
potential rival j in one of two events: either j does not enter (with probability sk (z)), or
j does enter (with probability 1 − sk (z)) but draws a valuation below y (with probability

9

Fk0 (y|z)). When all Nk −1 potential rivals play equilibrium strategies, we may therefore write
i’s bidding problem as
max U0 (vi − βk (y|z)) · [sk (z) + (1 − sk (z))Fk0 (y|z)]Nk −1 .
y

Taking a first-order condition with respect to y and enforcing the equilibrium condition
y = vi , we ultimately obtain the following differential equation characterizing the symmetric
equilibrium post-entry bidding strategy βk (·|z):
βk0 (v|z) = λ0 (v − βk (v|z))

(Nk − 1)(1 − sk (z))fk0 (v|z)
,
sk (z) + (1 − sk (z))Fk0 (v|z)

(2)

where βk0 (v|z) and fk0 (v|z) are respectively the derivatives of βk (v|z) and Fk0 (v|z) with respect
to v. Combined with the boundary condition βk (vk (0|z)|z) = 0, the differential equation (2)
uniquely determines the post-entry bidding strategy βk (·|z).
Finally, consider the threshold sk (z) characterizing equilibrium entry at observables (Nk , z).
In any equilibrium with nontrivial entry, this must be such that a bidder with signal Si =
sk (z) is just indifferent to entry against Nk − 1 rivals who play equilibrium strategies. Recalling that bidder i must forego the opportunity cost c(z) to enter, this in turn implies the
breakeven condition for nontrivial entry (i.e., sk (z) ∈ (0, 1)):
Π(sk (z), sk (z); Nk ) = U0 (c(z)),

(3)

where Π(si , sk (z); Nk ) denotes the expected post-entry profit of a potential bidder with signal
realization Si = si against Nk − 1 potential rivals who play equilibrium strategies. As shown
in Appendix A, the breakeven condition (3) (see Appendix A for an equivalent expression
(24)) will uniquely determine sk (z). Furthermore, for all k ∈ K, if sk (z) ∈ (0, 1) then sk (z)
is strictly increasing in both k and z. Finally, if sk (z) < 1, then sl (z) < 1 for all l > k.

2.4

Linking observables to unobservables

Let Z = {z ∈ Z̄ : s1 (z) ∈ [0, 1)} denote the subset of realizations z such that equilibrium
involves at least some bidding; in what follows, we focus on z ∈ Z without essential loss of
generality.8 For each k ∈ K and z ∈ Z, let Gk (b|z) be the equilibrium distribution of bids
8

Whether entry occurs depends only on z, not on N , since s1 (z) < 1 implies sk (z) < 1 for all k ∈ K.

10

submitted at (Nk , z), gk (b|z) be the density of Gk (b|z), and bk (α|z) be the quantile function
associated with Gk (b|z). As usual, observing bids will (point-) identify Gk (·|z) for each k ∈ K
and z ∈ Z. Similarly, recalling Si ∼ U [0, 1], we may (point-) identify the equilibrium entry
threshold sk (z) for each (k, z) from observed probabilities of entry:
sk (z) = 1 −

E[n|Nk , z]
.
Nk

We next derive the key equilibrium inverse bidding function linking the directly identified
objects s1 (z), ..., sK (z), G1 (·|z), ..., GK (·|z) to latent bid-stage primitives. Toward this end,
following GPV (2009), we first apply the change of variables bi = βk (vi |z) to the first-order
condition (2), then exploit strict monotonicity of bi in vi to re-express both bids and values
in terms of their respective quantile functions bk (α|z) and vk (α|z). These transformations
ultimately yield the following equilibrium quantile inverse bidding function, which is the basis
for our subsequent analysis:
vk (α|z) = bk (α|z) + λ−1
0 (Rk (α|z)),

k = 1, ..., K,

(4)

where the argument Rk (α|z) to the unknown function λ−1
0 (·) is defined as
Rk (α|z) ≡

sk (z) + (1 − sk (z))α
.
(Nk − 1)(1 − sk (z))gk (bk (α|z)|z)

(5)

Properties of βk (·|z) imply that bk (0|z) = 0, that bk (·|z) is differentiable on its domain,
and that Rk (·|z) is continuous on [0, 1] and differentiable on the same domain as vk (·|z).9
Furthermore, (point) identification of sk (z), Gk (·|z) implies (point) identification of bk (·|z)
and Rk (·|z), and hence (point) identification of the right-hand side of (4) up to λ−1
0 .

3

Identified sets for bid-stage primitives

This section provides a sharp nonparametric characterization of restrictions on bid-stage
primitives (λ−1
0 , F0 , C0 ) generated by the bid distributions G1 (·|z), ..., GK (·|z), taking entry
thresholds s1 (z), ..., sK (z) as given. Based on this characterization, we show that risk
aversion is nonparametrically testable in the sense that, given variation in either N or z,
risk neutrality is outside the identified set when bidders are strictly risk averse. We then
9

I.e., either [0, 1] if lima→0 vk0 (a|z) < ∞, or (0, 1] if lima→0 vk0 (a|z) = ∞, when also lima→0 Rk0 (a|z) = ∞.
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derive implications for point identification based on variation in z and for identification with
parametric utility, as well as for conditional identification with a parametric copula.
Our bid-stage focus is motivated by two findings in GL (2014). First, they show how to
map restrictions on (F0 , C0 ) implied by bidding behavior into identified sets for the entry cost
function c(z) via the breakeven condition (3), assuming that bidders are risk neutral so that
λ−1
0 is the identity function. In Appendix A.3, we show that the sharp bid-stage identified
set for (λ−1
0 , F0 , C0 ) implies identified bounds on c(z) through the breakeven condition (3).
Second, in their risk-neutral context, GL (2014) find that entry-stage restrictions convey
little additional information on bid-stage primitives. For this reason, we focus on restrictions
on (λ−1
0 , F0 , C0 ) implied by equilibrium bidding, taking observed entry patterns as given.
One could refine the identified sets below to incorporate entry-stage restrictions following
Appendix A of GL (2014). But in view of GL (2014)’s findings, we do not pursue this
exercise here.

3.1

Nonparametric bid-stage identifed set for (λ−1
0 , F0 , C0 )

We begin by analyzing the nonparametric bid-stage identified set for (λ−1
0 , F0 , C0 ), denoted
I and defined formally as follows:
−1 × F × C, is the
Definition 1. The bid-stage identified set for (λ−1
0 , F0 , C0 ), denoted I ⊂ Λ

set of all (λ−1 , F, C) ∈ Λ−1 × F × C which jointly satisfy equations (1) and (4) for all k ∈ K
and all z ∈ Z.
Equivalently, I is the subset of Λ−1 × F × C such that, for all k ∈ K and z ∈ Z, Gk (·|z) is
the equilibrium bid distribution implied by each (λ−1 , F, C) ∈ I given sk (z).
We next provide a sharp characterization of I, emphasizing restrictions on λ−1 generated by equilibrium bidding behavior. Toward this end, consider any candidate λ−1 ∈
Λ−1 . Under the hypothesis λ−1 = λ−1
0 , the quantile inverse bidding function (4) implies a
unique set of candidates ṽ1 (·|z; λ−1 ), ..., ṽK (·|z; λ−1 ) for the unknown latent quantile functions
v1 (·|z), ..., vK (·|z):
ṽk (α|z; λ−1 ) ≡ bk (α|z) + λ−1 (Rk (α|z)),
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k = 1, ..., K.

(6)

By construction, these candidates ṽ1 (·|z; λ−1 ), ..., ṽK (·|z; λ−1 ) are identified up to λ−1 and
well-defined for any λ−1 ∈ Λ−1 . Furthermore, properties of bk (·|z) and Rk (·|z) imply that,
for all λ−1 ∈ Λ−1 , ṽk (·|z; λ−1 ) is differentiable on the same domain as vk (·|z).
−1 and entry behavior as given, primitives (F , C ) ∈ F ×
Next observe that taking λ−1
0
0
0 ∈Λ

C influence bidding behavior only through the latent quantile functions v1 (·|z), ..., vK (·|z) (see
(1)). To determine whether any candidate λ−1 ∈ Λ−1 is consistent with bid-stage observables,
it is therefore sufficient to determine whether there exists a structure (F, C) ∈ F ×C consistent
with the candidate quantile functions ṽ1 (·|z; λ−1 ), ..., ṽK (·|z; λ−1 ) generated by λ−1 through
(6). This turns out to reduce to a set of five restrictions on ṽ1 (·|z; λ−1 ), ..., ṽK (·|z; λ−1 ),
yielding the following sharp alternative characterization of the bid-stage identified set I:
be the set of λ−1 ∈ Λ−1 such that the candidate quantile functions
Theorem 1. Let Λ−1
I
−1
ṽk (·|z; λ ) defined by (6) satisfy all of the following restrictions M, O, I, D and S:
M For all k ∈ K, z ∈ Z, and all a ∈ (0, 1], ṽk0 (a|z; λ−1 ) is bounded away from zero.
O For all k, l ∈ K and z, z 0 ∈ Z such that sk (z) ≤ sl (z 0 ), ṽk (a|z; λ−1 ) ≤ ṽl (a|z 0 ; λ−1 ) for all
a ∈ [0, 1], with equality if sk (z) = sl (z 0 ).
I For all k, l ∈ K and z, z 0 ∈ Z, ṽk (1|z; λ−1 ) = ṽl (1|z 0 ; λ−1 ).
D For all k, l ∈ K and z, z 0 ∈ Z such that sk (z) ≤ sl (z 0 ), and all y, y 0 ∈ R with y 0 ≥ y,




1−sk (z) ṽk−1 (y 0 |z; λ−1 )−ṽk−1 (y|z; λ−1 ) ≥ 1−sl (z 0 ) ṽl−1 (y 0 |z 0 ; λ−1 )−ṽl−1 (y|z 0 ; λ−1 ) .
S For all k, l, m ∈ K and z, z 0 , z 00 ∈ Z such that sk (z) < sl (z 0 ) < sm (z 00 ),
(1 − sk (z)) ṽk−1 (y|z; λ−1 ) − (1 − sl (z 0 )) ṽl−1 (y|z 0 ; λ−1 )
sl (z 0 ) − sk (z)
≥

−1 (y|z 00 ; λ−1 )
(1 − sl (z 0 ))ṽl−1 (y|z 0 ; λ−1 ) − (1 − sm (z 00 ))ṽm
.
sm (z 00 ) − sl (z 0 )

Then: for any λ−1 ∈ Λ−1 , there exists (F, C) ∈ F × C such that (λ−1 , F, C) ∈ I if and only
−1
if λ−1 ∈ Λ−1
I . Moreover, in this case, (λ , F, C) ∈ I for all (F, C) ∈ F × C such that for all
k ∈ K and z ∈ Z,
ṽk−1 (y|z; λ−1 ) =

F (y) − C(F (y), sk (z))
for all y ∈ [ṽk (0|z; λ−1 ), ṽk (1|z; λ−1 )].
1 − sk (z)

Recalling that ṽ1 (·|z; λ−1 ), ..., ṽK (·|z; λ−1 ) are identified up to λ−1 , Theorem 1 implies
that we can express restrictions on λ−1 generated by equilibrium bidding solely in terms
of directly identified objects. Moreover, for any λ−1 ∈ Λ−1
I , only one set of selected distributions F1 (·|z), ..., FK (·|z) can be consistent with equilibrium bidding, and the set of
(C, F ) ∈ C × F consistent with λ−1 contains all those which reproduce these. Restrictions M-S reflect properties of F1 (·|z), ..., FK (·|z) implied by (F, C) ∈ F × C. Restriction M
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(strict monotonicity) follows since each density fk (·|z) is bounded. Restriction O (ordered
quantile functions) reflects the fact that entrant values are stochastically increasing in sk (z).
Restriction I (invariant top quantile) follows from stochastic ordering of Vi in Si , together
with the fact that for any z ∈ Z, the set of entering types will include the potential bidder
drawing the highest possible signal (Si = 1). Restriction D (positive conditional densities)
can be understood by noting that the c.d.f. of Vi given Si ∈ [sk (z), sl (z 0 )] is proportional to
(1 − sk (z))Fk (·|z) − (1 − sl (z 0 ))Fl (·|z 0 ). Finally, if Vi is stochastically increasing in Si , then
any conditional c.d.f. of the form F (Vi |Si ∈ [s, s0 ]) must be decreasing in both s and s0 . This
in turn implies Restriction S (stochastically increasing conditional distributions).
Theorem 1 has three main implications.10 First, and most important, risk aversion is
nonparametrically testable within the AS-RA model, with or without a continuous instrument
z. Second, if one observes a continuous instrument z which induces sufficient variation in
entry, then λ−1
0 may be identified following GPV (2009). Finally, if U0 belongs to a parametric
family, then the identified set will typically reduce to a simpler structure involving point
identification of U0 as in CGPV (2011) and set identification of (F0 , C0 ) as in GL (2014). We
next develop each of these implications in turn.

3.2

Nonparametric testability of risk neutrality

Although our statement of Theorem 1 allows for variation in both N and z, we anticipate
that valid external instruments z will in many cases be unavailable. We therefore view the
special case of variation in N only as of particular practical importance. In this section, we
show that risk neutrality is nonparametrically testable within the AS-RA model based on
variation in N only, with or without variation in z.
Toward this end, temporarily suppose Z is a singleton, in which case we may omit the (now
trivial) conditioning on z in notation. By Restriction I of Theorem 1, we have ṽk (1|λ−1
0 ) =
ṽl (1|λ−1
0 ) for all k, l ∈ K. Therefore by (6),
−1
bk (1) + λ−1
0 (Rk (1)) = bl (1) + λ0 (Rl (1)) ∀k, l ∈ K.
10

(7)

Our sharp nonparametric identified set characterization contributes to a rapidly growing literature on partial
identification in structure models; see, for example, Manski (2003), Manski and Tamer (2002), Haile and Tamer
(2003), Fan and Wu (2010), Chesher and Rosen (2013), Molinari (2020) and the references therein.
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Now consider any k, l ∈ K such that Rl (1) < Rk (1) and define Rkl ≡ [Rl (1), Rk (1)]. By the
mean value theorem, over the interval Rkl , we must have
min λ−1,0
0 (x) ≤

x∈Rkl

λ0−1 (Rk (1)) − λ−1
0 (Rl (1))
≤ max λ0−1,0 (x),
x∈Rkl
Rk (1) − Rl (1)

or equivalently substituting from (7),
min λ−1,0
0 (x) ≤ −

x∈Rkl

bk (1) − bl (1)
≤ max λ0−1,0 (x).
Rk (1) − Rl (1) x∈Rkl

(8)

Recall that weak risk aversion (U000 ≤ 0) implies λ00 ≥ 1 and hence 0 ≤ λ0−1,0 ≤ 1. Global
risk neutrality (U000 = 0) corresponds to the special case λ−1,0
0 (x) = 1 for all x. We say that
bidders are strictly risk averse at x if U000 (x) < 0, or equivalently if λ0−1,0 (x) < 1.
Now consider the implications of these facts for testing. If bidders are strictly risk averse
for some x ∈ Rkl , then we must have λ−1,0 (x) < 1 on an open subset of Rkl , which since
R R (1)
λ−1,0 ≤ 1 and bk (1) − bl (1) = Rkl(1) λ−1,0 (x) dx implies
0≤−

bk (1) − bl (1)
< 1.
Rk (1) − Rl (1)

In contrast, if bidders are globally risk neutral, then inf x λ0−1,0 (x) = supx λ0−1,0 (x) = 1 and
therefore in view of (8) we must have
−

bk (1) − bl (1)
= 1.
Rk (1) − Rl (1)

Furthermore, since we cannot have λ0−1,0 (x) > 1, it follows that any candidate λ−1 ∈ Λ−1
rationalizing the data must satisfy λ−1,0 (x) = 1 for x ∈ Rkl .
Taken together, these facts imply that risk neutrality is testable in the following strong
sense, which for completeness we state reintroducing potential variation in z:
Corollary 1. Let R̄(1) ≡ supk∈K,z∈Z Rk (1|z) and R(1) ≡ inf k∈K,z∈Z Rk (1|z). Then the
following statements hold:
1. If bidders are risk neutral, then any λ−1 ∈ Λ−1
must satisfy λ−1,0 (x) = 1 for all x ∈
I
[R(1), R̄(1)];
2. If, for any x ∈ [R(1), R̄(1)], bidders are strictly risk averse at x, then no risk neutral
model can rationalize bid-stage behavior.
Note that Corollary 1 turns only on an invariant top quantile of values among entrants
(Restriction I of Theorem 1). Restriction I is here a consequence of the assumption that valuations are stochastically increasing in signals, together with the fact that the set of entering
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types (if nonempty) will always include the potential bidder with the highest possible signal
(Si = 1). Importantly, however, a similar insight applies in any first-price auction where
at least one quantile of values is invariant to either N or z. CGPV (2011) have considered
parametric quantile restrictions, including quantile invariance, as a basis for estimation with
parametric U0 . To our knowledge, however, the fact that quantile invariance also implies
nonparametric testability of risk neutrality, including with only discrete instruments, has not
previously been observed.
Remark. In Section 4.2, we propose a likehood ratio test for risk neutrality, which uses all
restrictions in Theorem 1. As suggested in prior versions of this paper, however, one could
also develop testing procedures based directly on Corollary 1, which uses only Restriction I.
For example, one could test restrictions of the form H0 : bl (1) − bk (1) = Rk (1) − Rl (1) against
H1 : bl (1) − bk (1) < Rk (1) − Rl (1), suitably weighted across k, l ∈ K, and adapting estimators
K
in CGPV (2011) to conduct inference on {bk (1)}K
k=1 and {Rk (1)}k=1 .

3.3

Identification with a continuous instrument z

As shown in Corollary 1, Theorem 1 yields substantive restrictions on primitives even based
only on excludable variation in N . If a continuous entry instrument z is available, however,
this can qualitatively sharpen identification in at least two respects.
First, if there exist z, z 0 ∈ Z such that for distinct k, l ∈ K we have sk (z) = sl (z 0 ), then
by Restriction O of Theorem 1 we must also have vk (·|z) = vl (·|z 0 ). Following GPV (2009),
we may therefore substitute from (4) to obtain the compatibility condition
−1
0
0
bk (a|z) + λ−1
0 (Rk (a|z)) = bl (a|z ) + λ0 (Rl (a|z )),

∀ a ∈ [0, 1].

(9)

Further suppose that Rk (0|z) = Rl (0|z 0 ) = 0, which here holds if and only if the support
of Vi |Si includes 0 at Si = sk (z) = sl (z 0 ). Results in GPV (2009) then establish that the
compatibility condition (9) identifies λ−1
0 on its empirical domain:
Corollary 2. Consider any distinct k, l ∈ K. Suppose that there exist z, z 0 ∈ Z such that
sk (z) = sl (z 0 ), and that the support of Vi |Si = sk (z) includes 0. Then λ−1
0 is identified on
0
[0, maxa max{Rk (a|z), Rl (a|z)}] and Fk (v|z) is identified at z.
Second, even when z induces insufficient entry variation to apply Corollary 2, access to a
continuous instrument z allows us to extend the argument underlying Corollary 1 to obtain
11
point identification of λ−1,0
0 (r) for at least some r:
11

This fact was first noted, but not exploited, at the beginning of Section 5.3 in CGPV (2011).
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Corollary 3. For each k ∈ K, let R̄k (1) ≡ supz∈Z Rk (1|z) and Rk (1) ≡ inf z∈Z Rk (1|z).
Suppose there exists z ∈ Int(Z) such that sk (z) ∈ (0, 1). Then, for each k ∈ K, R̄k (1) > Rk (1)
and λ0−1,0 (r) is identified for all r ∈ [Rk (1), R̄k (1)].
−1,0
Even when λ−1
0 (r) itself is not identified, identification of λ0 (r) may be of interest. For

example, differentiating the definition λ0 (x) ≡ U0 (x)/U00 (x), one obtains
ARA(λ−1
0 (r)) =

1
rλ0−1,0 (r)

1
− ,
r

(10)

where ARA(r) ≡ −U 00 (r)/U 0 (r) is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Thus,
for example, if U0 satisfies CARA, then the right-hand side of (10) must be constant, while
−1
if U0 satisfies CRRA, then ARA(λ−1
0 (r))/λ0 (r) must be constant. In view of Corollary 3,

both restrictions are testable in principle when z is continuous.

3.4

Point identification of λ−1
0 with parametric utility

In some applications, one may be willing to assume that U0 belongs to a parametric family:
−1
i.e., that λ−1
0 = λ (·; γ0 ) for some γ0 ∈ Γ, with Γ a compact subset of a finite dimensional

Euclidean space. Theorem 1 will then often imply point identification of λ−1
0 , although
potentially only set identification of other bid-stage primitives.
To see this, recall from Theorem 1 that γ = γ0 implies that ṽl (1|z; γ) is constant for all k
and z. Taking v̄ ≡ ṽk (1|z; γ) as an auxiliary parameter to be identified, we may equivalently
express this restriction as
v̄ = bk (1|z) + λ−1 (Rk (1|z); γ0 ),

∀ k ∈ K, z ∈ Z.

(11)

This parallels the system of estimating restrictions considered by CGPV (2011), here derived
directly from AS entry. If the system (11) has a unique solution (γ0 , v̄), then identification
0
0
of λ−1
0 is immediate, with identification of F1 (·|z), ..., FK (·|z) following through the quantile

inverse bid function (6). Uniqueness will in general depend on both the parametric family
considered and the scope of variation in (N, z). But for the CARA and CRRA utility families,
the most widely employed single-parameter families, (11) can be shown to have a unique
solution, leading to the following corollary:
Corollary 4. Assume that U0 belongs to either of the following parametric families:
CRRA U0 (x) = x1−γ0 ; γ0 ∈ [0, γ̄] for some γ̄ < 1.
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CARA U0 (x) = x for γ0 = 0; U0 (x) ∝ (1 − e−γ0 x ) for γ0 ∈ (0, γ̄] with γ̄ < ∞.
Further suppose that Rk (1|z) 6= Rl (1|z 0 ) for some k, l ∈ K and z, z 0 ∈ Z. Then λ−1
0 and
0 (·|z) are point identified.
F10 (·|z), ..., FK
0 (·|z) may
Depending on the scope of variation in z, point identification of F10 (·|z), ..., FK

not be sufficient to point-identify F0 and C0 , hence model primitives as a whole may be only
0
0
set-identified. But given point identification of λ−1
0 and F1 (·|z), ..., FK (·|z), we may construct

identified sets for remaining bid-stage primitives F0 and C0 , as well as the entry cost function
c(z), following GL (2014) as described in Appendix A.3.

3.5

Conditional identification with a parametric copula

In addition, or as an alternative, to parameterizing utility, one may be willing to assume that
the value-signal copula C0 belongs to a known parametric family: i.e., C0 (a, s) = C(a, s; θ0 ),
with θ0 an element of a compact subset Θ of some Euclidean space.12 In this case, (λ−1
0 , F0 )
are typically identified up to the copula parameter θ0 , which can substantially simplify inference as we discuss in Section 4.4.
We develop this result focusing on variation in N , although it extends immediately to
variation in z. Let ΘI denote the bid-stage identified set for θ0 : i.e., the set of θ ∈ Θ for
which there exist some (λ−1 , F ) ∈ Λ−1 × F such that (λ−1 , F, C(·, ·; θ)) ∈ I. For each k ∈ K,
define a quantile index function hk : [0, 1] × Θ → [0, 1] as follows:
hk (a; θ) ≡

a − C(a, sk ; θ)
.
1 − sk

(12)

Note that, interpreted as a function of a, each hk (·; θ) is identified up to the unknown copula
parameter θ. Furthermore, at θ = θ0 , we have from (1) that for each k ∈ K
Fk0 (y) =

F0 (y) − C(F0 (y), sk ; θ0 )
≡ hk (F0 (y); θ0 ).
1 − sk

(13)

Applying the change of variables y = v0 (a) on both sides of (13) and inverting Fk (·) in
the resulting expression, we obtain the identity v0 (a) ≡ vk (hk (a; θ0 )), whose left-hand side
crucially does not depend on k. Under the hypothesis θ = θ0 , we may thus transform the
12

Parametric copula assumptions have also been proposed to correct for selection in other contexts, see e.g.
Arellano and Bonhomme (2017).
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quantile inverse first order conditions (4) into a system of compatibility conditions paralleling
GPV (2009) by reindexing through hk (a; θ):
−1
bk (hk (a; θ)) + λ−1
0 (Rk (hk (a; θ))) = bl (hl (a; θ)) + λ0 (Rl (hl (a; θ))) for all k, l ∈ K.

(14)

For θ 6= θ0 , equation (14) will misspecify the true equilibrium relationship, hence there need
not exist λ−1 ∈ Λ−1 satisfying (14). But if θ ∈ ΘI , then there exists at least one candidate
λ−1 ∈ Λ−1 satisfying (14). In this case, under mild technical conditions on C(a, s; θ), one
can extend arguments in GPV (2009) to recover this function from (14). In the following
theorem, let H(a, s; θ) ≡

1−∂C(a,s;θ)/∂a
s+a−C(a,s;θ) ,

and for any r̄ > 0, let Λ−1 [0, r̄] be the set of functions

obtained by restricting elements of Λ−1 to the domain [0, r̄].
Theorem 2. Consider any θ ∈ ΘI such that there exists at least one pair k, l ∈ K satisfying: (i) for all a ∈ (0, 1), ∂C(a, sk ; θ)/∂a < 1 and ∂C(a, sl ; θ)/∂a < 1, and (ii) the set
Akl (θ) ≡ {a ∈ [0, 1] : (Nk − 1)H(a, sk ; θ) = (Nl − 1)H(a, sl ; θ)} is of Lebesgue measure zero.
−1
Then, for this θ, there exist unique λ−1
θ ∈ Λ [0, maxk∈K,a∈[0,1] Rk (a)] and Fθ ∈ F such that
(λ−1
θ , Fθ , C(·, ·; θ)) ∈ I.
Note that the conditions in Theorem 2 depend only on properties of C(a, s; θ), which
can easily be checked numerically for any candidate θ ∈ Θ. Condition (i) implies that
Rk (0) = Rl (0) = 0, so that 0 is in the equilibrium domain of λ−1
0 . Condition (ii) rules out
pathologies which might lead bidding functions to be tangent on an open interval, in which
case there could exist an interval of a ∈ [0, 1] on which (14) would hold trivially for any
λ−1 ∈ Λ−1 . So long as for each θ we can find at least one pair of competition levels such that
both conditions hold—a very mild restriction in standard parametric families—Theorem 2
implies that identification essentially reduces to characterizing the identified set ΘI for θ,
which can simplify inference as we discuss in Section 4.4. Note also that at θ = θ0 , the
same candidates (λ−1
θ , Fθ ) must satisfy (14) for all k, l ∈ K. This induces a continuum of
identifying restrictions on θ0 which must hold for all θ ∈ ΘI .

4

Set inference on bid-stage primitives

We next consider inference based on the identification results above, focusing particularly on
prospects for set inference when the model primitives is only partially identified. We consider
an i.i.d. sample of L auctions where N varies exogenously on the set N = {N1 , ..., NK } but
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no cost shifter z is available. For each auction l = 1, ..., L, we observe the number of potential
bidders Nl , the entry decision eil ∈ {0, 1} for each potential bidder i = 1, ..., Nl , and the bid
bil submitted by each entrant. We parameterize bid-stage primitives flexibly in terms of
Bernstein polynomial sieves as described below. We then apply results in CCT (2018) to
develop tests for risk aversion and to construct confidence sets for bid-stage primitives using
the restrictions in Theorem 1.
CCT (2018) propose three procedures to construct confidence sets for potentially setidentified parametric likelihood or moment (equality and inequality) based models. Their
Procedures 1 and 2 are Monte Carlo simulation based confidence sets, and their Procedure 3
is a profile (quasi-) likelihood ratio based confidence sets for the identified set of a scalar parameter, using simple critical values from Chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom.
Recall that the bid-stage primitives (U0 , F0 , C0 ) ∈ U × F × C consist of smooth functions that
also satisfy some shape restrictions and the additional restrictions imposed in Theorem 1. In
what follows, we approximate the bid-stage primitives by flexible Bernstein polynomial sieves
with large sieve dimensions so that the approximation error (or sieve bias) is of a smaller
order and hence could be ignored in first order asymptotics (see, for example, Chen (2007)).
We can then interpret bid-stage primitives as belonging to flexible parametric families so
that CCT’s results are applicable. We emphasize, however, that these families can be as
flexible (over-parameterized) as desired, subject to standard concerns of computational cost
and potential over-fitting. In particular, we do not require these flexible parameters to be
point-identified, allowing researchers to target (insofar as possible) only restrictions implied
directly by the AS-RA model.

4.1

Flexible parametric likelihood framework

Insofar as we aim to apply CCT (2018), we could in principle consider either flexible likelihoodbased or optimal moment-type (optimal two-step GMM, continuous updating GMM, or generalized empirical likelihood) approaches to inference. We here explore the maximum likelihood approach, exploiting the fact that CCT (2018)’s results accommodate likelihood models
with parameter dependent support (Appendix C of CCT). This is critical since, as pointed
out by Donald and Paarsch (1993), the maximum predicted bid in a first-price auction will
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depend on the parameters to be estimated, leading to failure of standard regularity conditions
for the asymptotic normality of MLE parameter estimation even in point-identified models.
To our knowledge, this is the first exploration of CCT (2018)’s approach to set inference
in first-price auctions. Our flexible parametric evaluation of the likelihood by substitution
from first order conditions for equilibrium bidding is (we believe) also novel and should be
applicable in other auction models.
Since we are primarily interested in bid-stage inference, we treat entry thresholds s ≡
(s1 , ..., sK ) as auxiliary parameters to be estimated. Let S denote the admissible set for s:
i.e., the set of s ∈ [0, 1]K such that sk ≥ sk−1 for all k = 2, ..., K. Should one additionally
wish to enforce entry constraints, one could start with bid-stage estimates obtained as below,
then proceed to an efficient second step enforcing entry constraints.
We parameterize bid-stage primitives flexibly as follows. For computational reasons outlined in Appendix C, we parameterize in terms of the reciprocal v̄ −1 rather than v̄ directly;
since v̄ weakly exceeds the maximum observed bid, v̄ −1 will belong to a known compact
interval V −1 . For any nonnegative integers d, D with D > 0 and d ≤ D, let Bd,D (u) denote
the dth Bernstein basis polynomial of degree D:
 
D d
Bd,D (u) ≡
u (1 − u)D−d ,
d

u ∈ [0, 1].

In inference, we target λ0 (x) = U0 (x)/U00 (x), rather its inverse λ−1
0 (x). We parameterize
λ(x) as a shifted Bernstein polynomial of degree Q, with both range and domain scaled by
the maximum valuation v̄. Specifically, for x ∈ [0, v̄], we define λ(x) = v̄ λ̃(v̄ −1 x), where λ̃(u)
is a shifted degree-Q Bernstein polynomial on [0, 1]:
λ̃(u) ≡ u +

Q
X

γj Bj,Q (u),

u ∈ [0, 1].

(15)

j=0

We know λ(0) = 0, which implies γ0 = 0, and that λ0 (x) ≥ 1, which we enforce by requiring
γj ≥ γj−1 for j = 1, ..., Q. We further assume γQ ≤ γ̄ for some constant γ̄ < ∞; a sufficient primitive condition for this is RRA(x) < 1/(1 − γ̄) for all x ≥ 0, where RRA(x) =
−xU 00 (x)/U 0 (x) denotes the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion. We take remaining coefficients γ ≡ (γj )Q
j=1 as parameters to be estimated, belonging to a compact set Γ
defined by the inequalities just described. Note that setting Q = 1 is equivalent to a CRRA
model for U , in which case λ(x) = x/(1 − RRA).
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In principle, one could parameterize (F0 , C0 ) using a flexible one-dimensional parameterization for F0 and a flexible two-dimensional parameterization for C0 . Recall, however, that
0 (see (1)). In practice, there(F0 , C0 ) enter only through the ex post distributions F10 , ..., FK
0 directly, reinterpreting the conditions of Theorem
fore, we instead parameterize F10 , ..., FK
0 . In our simulation exercise, which
1 as constraints on the parameter space for F10 , ..., FK
0 is easier for implemeninvolves only discrete instruments, flexibly parameterizing F10 , ..., FK

tation, insofar as it directly targets restrictions implied by Theorem 1. When, however, a
continuous entry instrument z is available, or when the cardinality of the set of entry instruments is otherwise, one may instead prefer to flexibly parameterize (F0 , C0 ) ∈ F × C directly.
Our proposed inference methods apply to either parameterization strategy, although we focus
0 in what follows.
on flexibly parameterizing F10 , ..., FK

Specifically, for each k = 1, ..., K, we first parameterize Fk as a Bernstein polynomial of
degree P , scaled to the interval [0, v̄]: i.e., we take Fk (y) = F̃k (v̄ −1 y), where
F̃k (u) ≡

P
X

φk,j Bj,P (u),

u ∈ [0, 1].

(16)

j=0

By definition, Fk (0) = 0 and Fk (v̄) = 1, which implies φk,0 = 0 and φk,P = 1. Let φk =
(φk,1 , ..., φk,P −1 ) collect remaining free coefficients in the parameterization (16), and φ =
(φ1 , ..., φK ) collect vectors φk across competition levels k = 1, ..., K.
We then enforce the requirement that the coefficients φ = (φ1 , ..., φK ) imply a set of
distributions F1 , ..., FK consistent with Theorem 1. Toward this end, for each vector of
equilibrium entry thresholds s ∈ S, let the admissible set for φ given s, denoted Φ(s), be the
set of vectors φ = (φ1 , ..., φK ) satisfying all of the following linear inequalities:
M’ For each k = 1, ..., K, φk satisfies 0 ≤ φk,1 ≤ φk,2 ≤ · · · ≤ φk,P −2 ≤ φk,P −1 ≤ 1.
O’ For all k = 1, ..., K − 1 and all u ∈ [0, 1],
P
−1
X

φk,j Bj,P (u) ≥

j=1

P
−1
X

φk+1,j Bj,P (u).

j=1

D’ For each k = 1, ..., K − 1 and all u ∈ [0, 1],




P
−1
P
−1
X
X
0
0
0
0
(1 − sk ) 
φk,j Bj,P
(u) + BP,P
(u) ≥ (1 − sk+1 ) 
φk+1,j Bj,P
(u) + BP,P
(u) .
j=1

j=1
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S’ For each k = 1, ..., K − 2 and all u ∈ [0, 1],
P
−1
X
j=1


φk,j

1 − sk
sk+1 − sk
−


Bj,P (u)

P
−1
X
j=1


φk+1,j



1 − sk+1
1 − sk+1
−
sk+1 − sk
sk+2 − sk+1
+

P
−1
X


φk+2,j

j=1

Bj,P (u)
1 − sk+2
sk+2 − sk+1


Bj,P (u) ≥ 0.

Conditions O’, D’, and S’ translate Conditions O, D, and S of Theorem 1 into the space
of coefficients φ used in our parameterizations of F1 , ..., FK ; in practice, we enforce these on
a fixed grid in [0, 1].13 Meanwhile, Condition M’ implies that each Fk is strictly monotone
on [0, v̄], which in turn implies Conditions I and M of Theorem 1.
Let ψ ≡ (v̄ −1 , s, γ, φ) denote the full vector of parameters to be estimated. Given the
constraints above, ψ will belong to a known compact set Ψ defined by
Ψ = {ψ ≡ (v̄ −1 , s, γ, φ) | v̄ −1 ∈ V −1 , s ∈ S, γ ∈ Γ, φ ∈ Φ(s)}.
Letting kl denote the competition level in auction l, the conditional log-likelihood of observing
outcome (eil , bil ) in auction l given Nl = Nkl and parameters ψ ∈ Ψ is
`il (ψ) = (1 − eil ) ln skl + eil ln(1 − skl ) + eil ln gkl (bil |ψ),

(17)

where ln gk (·|ψ) denotes the log density of equilibrium bids at competition Nk predicted by
the model at parameters ψ. To evaluate ln gk (bil |ψ), we must first solve for the equilibrium
bid function βk (y|ψ) at parameters ψ. Toward this end, let β̃k (u|ψ) be the solution to the
following scale-normalized differential equation in u ∈ [0, 1]:
β̃k0 (u|ψ) = λ̃ u − β̃k (u|ψ)) ·

(Nk − 1)(1 − sk )f˜k (u)
,
sk + (1 − sk )F̃k (u)

β̃k (0|ψ) = 0.

(18)

For any candidate v̄ and any y ∈ [0, v̄], we may then evaluate βk (y|ψ) as βk (y|ψ) =
v̄ β̃(v̄ −1 y|ψ). This allows us to try multiple candidates for v̄ without needing to re-solve
(18), as well as focus on candidates such that v̄ ≥ bil /β̃k (1|ψ) and thus ln gk (bil |ψ) is finite.
13

Specifically, we enforce O’, D’, and S’ at u ∈ {0.0, 0.1, ..., 0.7, 0.8, 0.85, 0.9, 0.95, 0.99, 1.0}. This spacing emphasizes restrictions for u close to 1, which in view of Theorem 1 we expect to be particularly informative.
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Moreover, defining uil implicitly by v̄ −1 bil ≡ β̃k (uil |ψ), we may express ln gk (bil |ψ) as
ln gk (bil |ψ) = ln fk (βk−1 (bil |ψ)) + ln βk−1,0 (bil |ψ)




= − ln λ̃ uil − v̄ −1 bil + ln v̄ −1 − ln(Nk − 1) + ln sk + (1 − sk )F̃k uil ) ,
where the second line follows by substitution from (18). In practice, we compute ln gkl (bil |ψ)
using a hybrid of grid and exact evaluation, solving (18) using Chebyshev collocation. The
resulting algorithm, detailed in Appendix C, yields fast, stable evaluation of both ln gkl (bil |ψ)
and its analytic gradients in ψ.
L
l
Finally, let {(eil , bil )N
i=1 , Nl }l=1 be a random sample, with asymptotics as L → ∞. We

also let L(ψ) denote the sample log-likelihood derived from (17):
L(ψ) =

Nl
L X
X

`il (ψ)

l=1 i=1

We aim to conduct inference on subvectors of ψ ∈ Ψ based on L(ψ) without assuming point
identification of ψ. We first outline a simple test for risk neutrality based on CCT (2018)’s
Procedure 3. We then construct confidence sets on identified sets for subvectors based on
CCT (2018)’s Procedure 2. Finally, we discuss potential simplifications introduced by a
parametric copula.

4.2

A likelihood ratio test for risk neutrality

We first propose a test for risk neutrality based on Procedure 3 of CCT (2018), which provides
a simple approach to constructing robust confidence sets for scalar parameters within potentially set-identified models. Recall that risk neutrality implies λ0 (x) = x, which is equivalent
to γj = 0 for all j = 1, ..., Q. For Q > 1, this is a compound hypothesis, which requires the
more involved procedures described next. For Q = 1, however—which is equivalent to linear
λ0 and CRRA U0 —risk neutrality reduces to the simple hypothesis γ1 = 0. Furthermore,
because linear λ0 is nested by any higher-degree Bernstein parameterization, testing the null
of risk neutrality in a CRRA model with Q = 1 is valid within any alternative model of
degree Q > 1.
Combining these observations leads to the following simple test of risk neutrality. Let ψ̂1
maximize L(ψ) within the parameter space ΨQ=1 corresponding to the CRRA model with
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Q = 1. Let ψ̂0 maximize L(ψ) within ΨQ=1 subject to the null restriction γ1 = 0. Consider
the standard likelihood ratio test statistic
T S1 = 2L(ψ̂1 ) − 2L(ψ̂0 ).

(19)

Under the null of risk neutrality and conditions in Theorem 4.4 of CCT (2018), the distribution of the test statistic T S1 will be asymptotically first-order stochastically dominated
by Fχ21 , the chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom.14 Letting χ21,α be the α
quantile of Fχ21 (i.e., Fχ21 (χ21,α ) = α), one may therefore reject risk neutrality with at least
confidence level α whenever T S1 ≥ χ21,α . As noted above, this test is valid, although conservative, even when the alternative model of interest involves λ0 flexibly parameterized with
arbitrary Q > 1. We thus see this simple likelihood ratio test as a natural diagnostic before
considering inference within more flexible models. The simulation result in Section 5 indicates that, within the first-price AS-RA auction framework, our simple test for risk neutrality
is powerful even without a continuous instrument z.15

4.3

Confidence sets for bid-stage primitives

We now turn to confidence sets for (subvectors of) ψ applicable under flexible parameterizations of bid-stage primitives. Toward this end, we apply Procedures 1 and 2 of CCT (2018),
which yield asymptotically valid Monte Carlo confidence sets for the identified sets of ψ and
its subvectors, respectively.
To implement these procedures, we require a sample of parameters {ψ b }B
b=1 drawn from a
quasi-posterior distribution implied by L(ψ). Letting Π be a prior over Ψ, the quasi-posterior
distribution ΠL for ψ given the auction data is defined as
exp[L(ψ)] dΠ(ψ)
.
Ψ exp[L(ψ)] dΠ(ψ)

dΠL (ψ|Data) = R
14

(20)

In this case, the null hypothesis γ1 = 0 is on the edge of the admissible set for γ1 , which leads to a further
stochastic reduction in the distribution of T S1 over and above that in CCT (2018). Even relaxing the admissible
set for γ1 to include negative (risk-seeking) values, T S1 would be asymptotically dominated by a χ21 distribution
under conditions in CCT (2018). The boundary constraint γ1 ≥ 0 leads T S1 to be zero, instead of positive, when
this constraint binds, which further stochastically reduces T S1 .
15
Fang and Tang (2014) propose a nonparametric test for risk aversion in ascending auctions which extends to
selective entry when the entry cost is observable, while LLZ (2015) use both first price and ascending formats to
propose a reduced form test for risk aversion.
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To form Π, we use uniform priors over the relevant admissible sets for all elements of ψ except
the utility coefficients γ. For this step only, we reparameterize γ as γ̃ = (γ1 /γQ , ..., γQ−1 /γQ , γQ ),
with admissible set Γ̃ defined by 0 ≤ γ̃1 ≤ · · · ≤ γ̃Q−1 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ γ̃Q ≤ γ̄. We then adopt a
uniform prior over Γ̃, which ensures that the average slope λ0 (v̄)/v̄ is uniformly distributed
on [1, γ̄ +1] under the prior.16 Finally, we draw a parameter sample {ψ b }B
b=1 from ΠL using an
adaptive Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) algorithm adapting that in CCT (2018), described
in detail in Appendix C.
To construct confidence sets for the identified set of the full parameter vector ψ, we apply
Procedure 1 of CCT (2018). Specifically, for any α ∈ (0, 1), let ξ1−α be the (1 − α)th quantile
of {L(ψ b )}B
b=1 ; i.e., the sample of log-likelihood values obtained by evaluating L(·) at each
posterior parameter draw ψ b . The set Ψ̂α = {ψ ∈ Ψ : L(ψ) ≥ ξ1−α } is then a 100α%
confidence set for the identified set of ψ. That is, under conditions in CCT Appendix C,
Ψ̂α will cover the identified set for ψ with asymptotic probability α, even in the presence of
parameter-dependent support.
For inference on subvectors (or functionals) η of ψ, we apply Procedure 2 in CCT (2018).
We refer to CCT (2018) for a full description of this procedure, as well as to Appendix C
for details of our implementation. In brief, however, starting from the posterior parameter
b
b
sample {ψ b }B
b=1 obtained above, we compute for each ψ a profile criterion P L(ψ ) defined as

follows. For any ψ, ψ 0 ∈ Ψ, let DKL (ψ||ψ 0 ) denote the Kullback-Leibler divergence from the
distribution of observables implied by ψ to that implied by ψ 0 . P L(ψ b ) is then the infimum
of the profile log-likelihood L̃(η 0 ) = supψ∈Ψ {L(ψ) : η(ψ) = η 0 }, taken over the set of η 0 such
η
that there exists some ψ 0 ∈ Ψ with η(ψ 0 ) = η 0 and DKL (ψ b ||ψ 0 ) = 0. Finally, letting ξ1−α

be the (1 − α)th quantile of the sample of profile criteria {P L(ψ b )}B
b=1 , we take the set of
η
subvectors η such that L̃(η) ≥ ξ1−α
as a 100α% confidence set for the identified set for η.
16

In contrast, a uniform prior over the original space Γ would imply that λ(v̄)/v̄ has the same distribution as the
highest of Q draws from a uniform distribution over [1, γ̄ +1], which for Q > 1 assigns prior probability approaching
zero to values near the risk-neutral boundary λ(v̄)/v̄ = 1. For a more general discussion of sieve priors in Bayesian
inference, see Ghosal and van der Vaart (2017).
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4.4

Inference with a parameteric copula

0 , one may instead prefer to parameterize F
As an alternative to parameterizing F10 , ..., FK
0

and C0 , especially when the cardinality of the set of observables affecting entry behavior is
large. C0 could be parameterized either flexibly, for example as a two-dimensional Bernstein
polynomial, or within a low-dimensional parametric family. In either case, inference may
proceed essentially as in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. In view of Theorem 2, however, we also know
that (λ0 , F0 ) are conditionally identified up to θ0 . When θ0 is low-dimensional, this fact can
substantially simplify inference, as we discuss next.
For concreteness, suppose that C0 belongs to a single-parameter family with true parameter θ0 ; canonical examples include Gaussian copulas and many parametric Archimedean
copula families, such as the Gumbel, Clayton, Frank, Joe and Ali-Mikhail-Haq copulas. One
can then apply CCT Procedure 3 to obtain a robust 100α% confidence set Θ̂α for θ0 by
inverting the relevant profile likelihood ratio statistic. Furthermore, in view of Theorem 2,
under any maintained hypothesis θ = θ0 , we may conduct inference on (λ0 , F0 ) as if these
are point-identified. This suggests a natural approach to sensitivity analysis: recover estimates (λ̂θ , F̂θ ) for (λ0 , F0 ) under the hypothesis θ = θ0 , then trace out the resulting estimates
(λ̂θ , F̂θ ) across θ ∈ Θ̂α . This approach may be particularly attractive if one wishes to compare a baseline non-selective model with a richer AS-RA alternative, since it indicates both
whether selection is empirically important and how this may influence other primitives.
Proceeding to full set inference following CCT (2018), we can again leverage conditional
identification of (λ0 , F0 ) up to θ0 to simplify implementation. This is especially true for
subvector inference using CCT Procedure 2, which requires one to search over the set of
parameters observationally equivalent to a given posterior draw ψ b . Conditional identification
up to θ implies that this equivalent set can be indexed by a subset Θ̃b ⊂ Θ. In particular,
for scalar θ0 , characterizing the observationally equivalent set reduces to line search over θ,
regardless of the dimension of the target subvector. This can yield significant computational
savings, especially for high-dimensional subvectors.
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5

A simulation exercise

Finally, we explore our proposed methods in a Monte Carlo study based on the following true
data generating process (DGP). Bidders have CRRA utility: U0 (x) = U (x; ρ0 ) = x1−ρ0 . We
consider both risk neutral (ρ0 = 0) and risk averse (ρ0 = 0.5) baseline models; we also explore
testing risk neutrality at intermediate values of ρ0 . Valuations are drawn from a truncated
logistic distribution F0 with mean 0.5 and scale 0.2, truncated on the interval [0, v̄0 ] with
v̄0 = 1. Dependence between Vi and Si is captured by a Gumbel copula
n
o
C(F, s; θ) = exp −[(− log F )θ + (− log s)θ ]1/θ

for

1 ≤ θ < ∞,

with true parameter value θ0 = 1.5, corresponding to a Spearman’s rank correlation between
Vi and Si of approximately 0.475. N varies exogenously on the set N = {2, 4, 6, 8}, so that
K = 4 and K = {1, ..., 4}.
For each DGP considered, we draw 100 sets of Monte Carlo data at each of three sample
scales M ∈ {500, 1000, 2000}, where for each sample scale M we choose the number of
auctions Lk at each competition level k such that we observe approximately M bids for each
P4
M
k: i.e., Lk = d Nk (1−s
e,
with
L
=
1 Lk . We then apply the procedures in Section 4 to these
)
k
simulated data. We parameterize ex post distributions Fk0 (·) with Bernstein polynomials of
degree P = 7 as above. We parameterize λ0 (·) as Bernstein polynomials of degree Q = 1
(the true CRRA model), Q = 4, or Q = 7.
We begin by exploring the identified set for λ(x) numerically. Figure 1 plots pointwise
profiled Kullback-Leibler contour sets for the shape of λ0 under different combinations of ρ0
and Q. For the risk neutral model ρ0 = 0.0, these contour sets fall off steeply away from
the true value λ(x) = x, suggesting that (at least for our parameterizations) this case may
be close to point identified. In contrast, when ρ0 = 0.5, pointwise profiled KL divergence
is numerically flat (with both level and slope less than 10−5.5 ) on an interval around each
true value λ(x) = 2x, for both Q = 4 and Q = 7. Generically, therefore, one should treat
parameters as set-identified.
[Figure 1 about here.]
We next explore performance of our testing and inference methods in the CRRA case
with Q = 1. This can be viewed either as a specification of interest in its own right, or
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as a device for testing risk neutrality within a more flexible alternative model. Figure 2
explores inference based on CCT Procedures 2 and 3 in a correctly specified CRRA model
with Q = 1. This figure describes rejection rates for hypothesized values of the average slope
λ0 (x)/x ≡ 1/(1 − ρ0 ), for our benchmark risk neutral (ρ0 = 0) and risk averse (ρ0 = 0.5)
DGPs with M = 1000 bids per auction. Actual confidence rates for both procedures are very
close to each other. Since results of CCT (2018) Procedures 2 and 3 should coincide under
point identification, this is exactly as we expect.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Meanwhile, Figure 3 presents power curves for our simple test of risk neutrality based
on Procedure 3 of CCT (2018). Panels (a) and (b) explore power of this test in our baseline CRRA DGP, under which both null and alternative models are correctly specified. As
expected, the test is somewhat conservative when ρ0 is close to 0, although it displays good
power as ρ0 moves away from 0. Meanwhile, Panels (c) and (d) present power curves obtained
when only the null model is correctly specified; for ρ0 > 0, the true bidding process involves
CARA, rather than CRRA, utility, although we continue to test within a CRRA (Q = 1)
specification. Encouragingly, power is comparable to that in the correctly specified CRRA
model, suggesting that this simple test can perform quite well even under misspecification of
the alternative model.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Finally, we turn to set inference in the full flexible model with Q > 1. We apply CCT
Procedure 2 to obtain pointwise confidence sets for the identified set for λ̃0 (x)/x at the
points x = 0.4, x = 0.6, and x = 1.17 In constructing these confidence sets, we consider two
parameter vectors ψ, ψ 0 numerically equivalent if DKL (ψ||ψ 0 ) ≤ 10−5.0 , where DKL (ψ||ψ 0 ) is
scaled to reflect the expected loss in sample log-likehood L(ψ 0 ) per bid observed at each N ,
when true parameters are ψ. Inference will thus be somewhat conservative for true identified
sets, although we expect to cover contour sets based on DKL ≤ 10−5.0 with approximately
17

in view of Figure 1, we expect that at x = 1 only lower bounds on λ̃0 (x)/x will be informative. This lower
bound is interesting, however, since the model is globally risk neutral if and only if λ̃0 (1) = 1.
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correct probability. Note that, since λ̃0 (x)/x now depends on a vector of coefficients γ,
inference on λ̃0 (x)/x now requires Procedure 2; the simpler Procedure 3 will be inconsistent.
We first apply CCT Procedure 2 to construct confidence sets for λ̃0 (x)/x within our
main flexible specification with Q = 4. Figure 4 reports estimated coverage (acceptance)
rates for λ̃0 (x)/x for level α = 0.95 confidence sets, while Table 1 reports the estimated
probabilities with which level α = 0.95 and α = 0.99 confidence sets cover the DKL ≤ 10−5.0
and DKL ≤ 10−5.5 profiled contour sets for λ̃0 (x)/x, as well as median confidence intervals
for λ̃0 (x)/x based on these confidence sets. As sample size increases, estimated coverage
probabilities for DKL ≤ 10−5.0 contour sets approach nominal confidence levels in almost all
cases. When ρ0 = 0.5 and x = 1, the low end of the DKL ≤ 10−5.0 contour set for λ̃0 (x)/x
is slightly under-covered; this may reflect the fact that x = 1 is well outside the true domain
of the argument v − βk (v) to λ̃0 , which is approximately [0, 0.5]. Even in this case, however,
the set of λ̃0 (x)/x thus under-covered is very small, as Figure 4 illustrates for the case of
α = 0.95. Moreover, as sample size increases, DKL ≤ 10−5.5 contour sets are covered with at
least nominal rates by confidence sets constructed at both α = 0.95 and α = 0.99.
[Figure 4 about here.]
[Table 1 about here.]
Finally, we turn to our most flexible specification, in which λ0 is parameterized as a
Bernstein polynomial of degree Q = 7. We emphasize that this is a very flexible parameterization, which we interpret as a “stress test” of the model’s capabilities. Figure 5 plots
coverage (acceptance) rates for λ̃0 (x)/x based on CCT Procedure 2 with α = 0.95 when
Q = 7. As above, we consider both risk averse (ρ0 = 0.5) and risk neutral (ρ = 0) baseline
DGPs, although we compute confidence rates only at x = 0.4 and x = 1.0. Especially when
ρ0 = 0.5 and x = 0.4, we find some under-coverage at the low end of the identified set. This
under-coverage appears to be driven by over-fitting with a very flexible parameterization for
λ0 (·). To explore this, we repeated estimation at ρ0 = 0.5 and x = 0.4 normalizing γ̃ relative
to γ3 and using a marginal exponential prior for γ3 , which serves to regularize the model
and prevent over-fitting. As illustrated in panel (c), this alternative prior does indeed resolve
the under-coverage issue noted with our baseline uniform prior, suggesting that priors tilted
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toward risk neutrality are advisable when λ0 is very flexibly parameterized.
[Figure 5 about here.]

6

Conclusion

This paper studies identification and inference in first price auctions with selective entry and
risk averse bidders. We establish results on nonparametric and semiparametric identification
of the model primitives based on variation either in the number of potential competitors
N or in an instrument z influencing bidders’ opportunity costs of entry. Assuming that
both utility and the ex ante distribution of potential bidders’ private information do not
depend on realizations of N and z, we provide a sharp characterization of the set of model
primitives consistent with equilibrium bidding behavior. We show that an implication of
this result is that risk neutrality is nonparametrically testable even with only variation in
N , and we provide a simple likelihood ratio test for risk neutrality, which is useful and
important in analyzing auction data given the different economic and policy implications
implied by different risk attitudes. Moreover, we show that with only variation in N , the
model primitives are nonparametrically set identified, while they can be point identified with
an additional continuous instrument z.
Based on these identification results, we propose a new approach to inference in set identified auction models, adapting CCT (2018) to our case. Our inference method is flexible and
has the advantage of accommodating both set identified models and models that have parameter dependent support. Noting that parameter dependent support problems are intrinsic
to auction models and also appear in other structural microeconometric models such as job
search models (Flinn and Heckman (1982)), and that partial identification and inference on
identified sets have been among the most active research areas in econometrics recently, our
inference method contributes to the literature by providing a flexible and computationally
convenient method to deal with both problems. As demonstrated in our simulation study,
our inference method has good finite sample performance and has potential to find wide
applications.

31

Appendix A: Theoretical details
For completeness, we first extend the simple AS-RA model presented in Section 2 to accommodate two potentially relevant real-world considerations: nonzero initial wealth for bidders
and financial (in addition to opportunity) costs of entry. We then provide a detailed characterization of equilibrium entry and bidding behavior within this extended model, demonstrating
in the process how the more general structure considered here collapses in all economically
relevant details to that in Section 2.
As above, we assume that potential bidders are risk averse with risk preferences described
by some symmetric concave Bernoulli utility function u(w), where w is net post-auction
wealth. Net entry costs are given by c(z) = c0 + c1 (z), where c0 denotes financial costs
of entry and c1 (z) denotes opportunity costs of entry. We further assume that bidders are
endowed with common initial wealth w0 ≥ c0 .
Following LLZ (2015), we now define a normalized utility function U (·) as a function of
the change in wealth x derived from bidding, normalized such that a bidder who enters the
auction but does not win receives zero normalized utility:
U (x) ≡ u(x + w0 − c0 ) − u(w0 − c0 ).
For simplicitly, and without loss of generality, we further normalize the scale of utility such
that U (1) = u(1 + w0 − c0 ) − u(w0 − c0 ) ≡ 1.
As noted by LLZ (2015), centered utility U (·) belongs to the same category of Arrow-Pratt
absolute risk aversion (increasing, constant, or decreasing) as initial utility u(·). Furthermore,
as we show below, knowledge of normalized utility U is equivalent to joint knowledge of nonnormalized (u, w0 , c0 ) with respect to characterizing equilibrium entry and bidding behavior.
In this sense, the simplified presentation in the text is without loss of generality.
We next provide a detailed derivation of the symmetric monotone Bayesian Nash equilibrium in our entry and bidding game. Recall that in any such equilibrium entry must
involve a signal threshold sN (z) such that bidders with signals Si ≥ sN (z) elect to enter. We
therefore characterize this equilibrium in two steps. First, for any potential entry threshold
s̄ ∈ [0, 1), we derive the strategy β(·|N, s̄) describing a symmetric monotone bidding equilibrium assuming that all bidders entered according to threshold s̄. We then characterize the
equilibrium entry threshold sN (z).

A.1

Equilibrium bidding

First consider the Stage 2 bidding problem faced by an entrant with valuation vi assuming
that i’s N − 1 potential rivals all enter according to some (arbitrary) Stage 1 entry threshold
s̄ ∈ [0, 1). We seek a strictly increasing bidding strategy β(·|N, s̄) such that bidder i with
valuation vi optimally bids β(vi |N, s̄) when facing N − 1 rivals who enter according to s̄ and
bid according to β(·|N, s̄).
Toward this end, let F (·|Sj ≥ s̄) denote the c.d.f. of rival j’s valuation conditional on
choosing to enter at threshold s̄:
Z 1
1
F (y|sj ≥ s̄) =
F (y|t) dt.
1 − s̄ s̄
Under Assumptions 1-4, the support of F (·|Sj ≥ s̄) is a connected interval of the form [v(s̄), 1],
where the infimum support v(s̄) is differentiable in s̄. Moreover, the density f (·|Sj ≥ s̄) is
locally bounded away from zero for all v ∈ (v(s̄), 1].
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Let F ∗ (·|N, s̄) (and f ∗ (·|N, s̄)) be the c.d.f. (and the pdf) of the maximum valuation
among rival entrants when i’s N − 1 rivals enter according to threshold s̄:
F ∗ (y|N, s̄) = [s̄ + (1 − s̄)F (y|Sj ≥ s̄)]N −1 ,
R1
∂
Since (1 − s̄)F (y|Sj ≥ s̄) = s̄ F (y|t) dt, we have ∂s̄
= −F (y|s̄), and thus F ∗ (y|N, s̄) is
increasing in s̄ (strictly for y such that F (y|s̄) < 1). Furthermore, since [s̄ + (1 − s̄)F (y|Sj ≥
s̄)] ≤ 1 (strictly for y < v̄), F ∗ (y|N, s̄) is decreasing in N (strictly if y < v̄).
Assuming that all potential rivals according to the symmetric monotone strategy β(·|N, s̄),
entrant i submitting bid bi ≡ β(yi |N, s̄) will outbid all potential rivals with probability
F ∗ (yi |N, s̄). The expected profit of entrant i with valuation vi who bids as if her type were
yi is therefore:
πN (yi , vi ; s̄) ≡ u(vi − β(yi |N, s̄) + w0 − c0 )F ∗ (yi |N, s̄) + u(w0 − c0 )(1 − F ∗ (yi |N, s̄))
= [u(vi − β(yi |N, s̄) + w0 − c0 ) − u(w0 − c0 )]F ∗ (yi |N, s̄) + u(w0 − c0 )
= U (vi − β(yi |N, s̄))F ∗ (yi |N, s̄) + u(w0 − c0 ).
Taking a first-order condition of the final expression with respect to yi , enforcing the equilibrium condition yi = vi , and solving for β 0 (·|N, s̄), we conclude that β(·|N, s̄) must satisfy
U (vi − β(vi |N, s̄)) f ∗ (vi |N, s̄)
U 0 (vi − β(vi |N, s̄)) F ∗ (v|N, s̄)
U (vi − β(vi |N, s̄)) (N − 1)(1 − s̄)f (v|Sj ≥ s̄)
= 0
.
U (vi − β(vi |N, s̄)) s̄ + (1 − s̄)F (v|Sj ≥ s̄)

β 0 (vi |N, s̄) =

Imposing the boundary condition β(v(s̄)|N, s̄) = 0, we ultimately obtain an initial value
problem characterizing β(·|N, s̄):
β(v(s̄)|N, s̄) = 0,
U (v − β(v|N, s̄)) (N − 1)(1 − s̄)f (v|Sj ≥ s̄)
β 0 (v|N, s̄) = 0
,
U (v − β(v|N, s̄)) s̄ + (1 − s̄)F (v|Sj ≥ s̄)

v ∈ [v(s̄), v̄].

(21)

Arguments in LLZ (2015) show that (21) yields a unique solution β(·|N, s̄) which is
strictly increasing and differentiable in v, strictly increasing in N , and strictly decreasing and
continuous in s̄. Recalling that F ∗ (y|N, s̄) is increasing in s̄ and decreasing in N , expected
equilibrium Stage 2 profit
∗
πN
(vi ; s̄) ≡ U (vi − β(vi |N, s̄))F ∗ (vi |N, s̄) + u(w0 − c0 )

will therefore be strictly increasing and continuous in vi , strictly decreasing in N , and increasing (strictly for vi > v(s̄)) and continuous in s̄.
Observe that the equilibrium bidding function β(·|N, s̄) depends on the ex ante utility
function u(·), bidders’ initial wealth w0 , and financial entry costs c0 only through the normalized post-entry utility function U . For purposes of characterizing equilibrium bidding,
knowledge of U is thus equivalent to knowledge of (u, w0 , c0 ).

A.2

Equilibrium entry

Now consider the Stage 1 entry decision of potential bidder i with signal si facing N − 1
potential rivals who enter according to s̄ and bid according to β(·|N, s̄). Recall that i must
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forego opportunity costs c1 (z) from staying out. Holding the opportunity cost shifter z
constant, the change in payoff i expects from entry is therefore:
Z
0

v̄

∗
πN
(v; s̄) dF (v|Si = si ) − u(w0 + c1 (z))
Z v̄
U (v − β(v|N, s̄))F ∗ (v|N, s̄) dF (v|Si = si ) + u(w0 − c0 ) − u(w0 + c1 (z)).
=
0

Noting that u(w0 + c1 (z)) = u(c0 + c1 (z) + w0 − c0 ), we may equivalently rewrite the final
line as
Π(si ; s̄, N ) − U (c0 + c1 (z)),
where Π(si , s̄, N ) denotes the expected normalized post-entry profit of a bidder with signal
Si = si , facing N − 1 potential rivals who enter according to threshold s̄:
Z v̄
Π(si ; s̄, N ) ≡
U (v − β(v|N, s̄))F ∗ (v|N, s̄) dF (v|Si = si ).
0

Finally, consider the threshold sN (z) characterizing equilibrium entry at (N, z). In any
equilibrium with nontrivial entry (i.e. where sN (z) is strictly between 0 and 1), this threshold
sN (z) must be such that a bidder with signal si = sN (z) is just indifferent to entry. In view
of the final expression above, and recalling that c(z) ≡ c0 + c1 (z), this in turn implies a
break-even condition of the form given in the main text above:
Π(sN (z), sN (z); N ) ≡ U (c(z)).

(22)

∗ (v , s̄) is strictly increasing in v , strictly
Recall from above that bid-stage expected profit πN
i
i
increasing in s̄ for vi > v(s̄), and strictly decreasing in N . Combining these observations with
the fact that Vi is stochastically increasing in Si , and that the expectation of any continuous
function of Vi conditional on Si = si is continuous in si , it is straightforward to show that
pre-entry expected profit Π(si ; s̄, N ) is also increasing and continuous in si , increasing and
continuous in s̄, and decreasing in N . Hence the breakeven condition above will uniquely
determine sN (z). Furthermore, since c(z) is strictly increasing in z, sN (z) will be at least
weakly increasing in both N and z (strictly if sN (z) ∈ (0, 1)). Finally, note that we can have
sN (z) = 1 only if a potential bidder with signal Si = 1 earns
R v̄ nonpositive profit from entering,
bidding zero, and winning with certainty: i.e., only if 0 U (y) dF (y|Si = 1) ≤ U (c(z)). But
this condition does not depend on N . Thus if sN (z) < 1 for any N , sN 0 (z) < 1 for all N 0 .
Combining this equilibrium threshold sN (z) with the characterization of equilibrium bidding obtained above, we therefore conclude:

Theorem 3 (Li, Lu and Zhao (2015)). Suppose that U ∈ U, F ∈ F, and C ∈ C. Then
there exists a unique symmetric monotone pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium for any
N ∈ N and z ∈ Z. The equilibrium bidding strategy β(·|N, sN (z)) is the unique solution
to the initial value problem (21) with s̄ = sN (z). The equilibrium entry threshold sN (z) is
uniquely determined as follows:
• If Π(0, 0, N ) > U (c(z)), then sN (z) = 0 and all bidders enter.
• If Π(1, 1, N ) < U (c(z)), then sN (z) = 1 and no bidder enters.
• Otherwise, sN (z) is the unique solution to Π(sN (z), sN (z), N ) = U (c(z)).
Furthermore, sN (z) is increasing in both N and c(z), strictly if sN (z) ∈ (0, 1). Finally, if
sN (z) < 1, then sN 0 (z) < 1 for any N 0 > N .
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Note, once again, that knowledge of the normalized utility function U (·) and the total entry
cost c(z) are sufficient to fully characterize all aspects of equilibrium entry and bidding
behavior. In particular, it is not necessary to identify initial wealth w0 or to separate c(z)
into financial costs c0 versus opportunity costs c1 (z). The simplified framing in the main
text, in which we begin with normalized utility U and interpret c(z) as a pure opportunity
cost, is thus without any essential loss of generality.

A.3
Translating identified sets for bid-stage primitives into
bounds on conditional distributions and entry costs
First consider restrictions on (F0 , C0 ) imposed by equilibrium bidding, given a fixed candidate
−1
−1
λ for λ−1
0 belonging to the bid-stage identified set ΛI for λ0 defined by Theorem 1. This
−1
identified set could be a singleton when λ0 is point identified.
Toward this end, let S = {s ∈ [0, 1] : s = sk (z) for some k ∈ K, z ∈ Z}. Recall that if
sk (z) = sl (z 0 ), then by Restriction O we must have ṽk (y|z; λ−1 ) = ṽl (y|z 0 ; λ−1 ). With slight
abuse of notation, we may therefore define a new collection of candidate selected value c.d.f.s
F̃ (·; s, λ−1 ) for s ∈ S by setting, for each s ∈ S, F̃ (·; s, λ−1 ) ≡ ṽk−1 (·|z; λ−1 ) for some k ∈ K,
z ∈ Z such that sk (z) = s. From Theorem 1, the set of (F, C) ∈ F × C which rationalize
bid-stage observables at λ−1 ∈ Λ−1
I are those for which
F̃ (y; s, λ−1 ) =

F (y) − C(F (y), s)
1−s

∀s ∈ S, y ∈ R.

(23)

In other words, the set of (F, C) ∈ F × C rationalizing bid stage observables at λ−1 are those
which reproduce the distributions of entrant valuations F̃ (·; s, λ−1 ) implied by λ−1 at each
equilibrium entry threshold s ∈ S.
We next adapt Theorem 3 in GL (2014) to translate the set of candidates (F, C) ∈ F × C
into bounds on candidate conditional c.d.f.s F (y|Si = s) at
consistent with λ−1 ∈ Λ−1
I
each s ∈ S. Toward this end, let sl = inf S and su = sup S, and for each s ∈ S, let
t− (s) = sup{t ∈ {0} ∪ S : t < s} and t+ (s) = inf{t ∈ {1} ∪ S : t > s} be the nearest upper
and lower neighbors of s in S (or trivial bounds if no neighbor is available). For each s ∈ S
such that s > sl , we may then define an identified upper bound F̃ + (y|s; λ−1 ) on the set of
F (y|Si = s) consistent with our original λ−1 ∈ Λ−1
I as follows:
F̃ (y; t, λ−1 )(1 − t) − F̃ (y; s, λ−1 )(1 − s)
,
s−t
t↑t− (s)

F̃ + (y|s; λ−1 ) = lim

which we complete with the trivial bound F̃ + (y|sl ; λ−1 ) = I[y ≤ 0] at s = sl . Analogously,
for each s ∈ S such that s < su , we may define an identified lower bound F̃ − (y|s; λ−1 ) on
the set of F (y|Si = s) consistent with λ−1 by
F̃ (y; s, λ−1 )(1 − s) − F̃ (y; t, λ−1 )(1 − t)
,
t−s
t↓t+ (s)

F̃ − (y|s; λ−1 ) = lim

which we complete with the nontrivial bound F̃ − (y|su ; λ−1 ) = F̃ (y; su , λ−1 ) at s = su .
−1
Since λ−1 ∈ Λ−1
I , the candidate distributions F̃ (y; s, λ ) satisfy all conditions in Theorem
1. Under these conditions, F̃ + (·|s, λ−1 ) and F̃ − (·|s; λ−1 ) are both proper distributions over
Vi which satisfy F̃ + (y|s; λ−1 ) ≥ F (y|Si = s) ≥ F̃ − (y|s; λ−1 ) for every candidate F (·|Si = s)
implied by some (F, C) ∈ F × C such that (λ−1 , F, C) ∈ I. In particular, these inequalities
imply that F̃ − (·|s; λ−1 ) first-order stochastically dominates F (·|Si = s), which in turn firstorder stochastically dominates F̃ + (·|s; λ−1 ). Moreover, if s ∈ Int(S), so that t− (s) = t+ (s) =
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s, then F̃ + (·|s; λ−1 ) = F̃ − (·|s; λ−1 ), so that there exists only one candidate F (·|Si = s)
consistent with λ−1 . This case is relevant when, in addition to potential competition N , we
also observe a continuous entry instrument z. Under our assumptions, S will then be a union
of intervals in [0, 1], so that the bounds above will uniquely determine F (·|Si = s) for almost
every s ∈ S.
Finally, we translate the restrictions on (F, C) described above into bounds c+ (z; λ−1 ) and
−
c (z; λ−1 ) on the setR of cost values c(z) consistent with the hypothesis λ−1 = λ−1
0 . Toward
x
−1
this end, let U (x) = 1 1/λ(t) dt be the unique candidate for U0 implied by λ , and rewrite
the breakeven condition entry equilibrium condition (22) as
Z

vk (1|z) n

U y − bk (Fk (y|z)|z)

U (c(z)) =



0

o
× [sk (z) + (1 − sk (z))Fk (v|z)]N −1 dF (v|Si = sk (z)). (24)
−1
Recall that if λ−1 = λ−1
0 , then Fk (·|z) = F̃ (·; sk (z), λ ), implying that Fk (·|z) is identified
−1
−1
up to λ . Thus, given λ , all objects on the right-hand side of (24) are identified except F (v|Si = sk (z)), for which we have an identified lower bound F̃ − (·|sk (z); λ−1 ) which
first-order stochastically dominates F (·|Si = sk (z)), as well as an identified upper bound
F̃ + (·|sk (z); λ−1 ) which is first-order stochastically dominated by F (·|Si = s). Recalling
that the integrand in (24) equals bid-stage profit, which is increasing in v, we may plug in
F̃ + (·|sk (z); λ−1 ) for F (·|Si = sk (z)) to obtain an identified lower bound c− (Nk , z; λ−1 ) on
the set of c(z) consistent with λ−1 , and plug in F̃ − (·|sk (z); λ−1 ) to obtain an identified upper
bound c+ (Nk , z; λ−1 ). Since c(z) does not depend on Nk , we may then take intersections
across k ∈ K to obtain tighter bounds paralleling Theorem 4 of GL (2014), which may be
refined to sharp bounds following Appendix A of GL (2014).

Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. We first establish that for any (F, C) ∈ F × C, the true ex post quantile
functions v1 , v2 , ..., vK satisfy all restrictions in Theorem 1.
Restrictions I, O, and M are straightforward. True quantiles v1 , v2 , ..., vK must satisfy Restriction I since Vi is stochastically increasing in Si and the set of entering types (if nonempty)
always includes the potential bidder with Si = 1. Similarly, v1 , v2 , ..., vK must satisfy Restriction O since selected distributions of the form Vi |Si ≥ s are stochastically increasing in the
entry threshold s. Finally, v1 , v2 , ..., vK must satisfy Restriction M since, under Assumptions
1-4, each vk will be continuous on [0, 1] and continuously differentiable for all a ∈ [0, 1] except
possibly a = 0, with vk0 (a) = 1/fk (vk (a)) for all a where vk is differentiable. Finally, since
fk (y) is bounded, we must have vk0 (a) bounded away from zero for all a ∈ (0, 1].
0 satisfy these
We thus focus on Restrictions D and S. The proof that true F10 , F20 , ..., FK
restrictions depends only on properties of the copula C as the entry threshold varies, not
whether variation in the entry threshold comes from N or z. For simplicity, we thus present
the proof based on variation in N only, suppressing z in notation. The proof with variation
in both N and z is identical, but more notationally intensive.
First consider Restriction S. Rearranging the definition of the true c.d.f. Fk0 ,
Fk0 (y)(1

Z

1

− sk ) =
sk
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F 0 (y|t)dt.

Now consider the true distribution of Vi conditional on the event Si ∈ [sk , sk+1 ]:
1
F (y|Si ∈ [sk , sk+1 ]) ≡
sk+1 − sk
0

Z

sk+1

F 0 (y|t)dt =

sk

0 (y)(1 − s
Fk0 (y)(1 − sk ) − Fk+1
k+1 )
.
sk+1 − sk

By stochastic ordering, F 0 (y|Si ∈ [sk , sk+1 ]) is decreasing in k. Hence for all k = 2, ..., K we
must have restriction S:
0 (y)(1 − s
0 (y)(1 − s
0
Fk−1
F 0 (y)(1 − sk ) − Fk+1
k−1 ) − Fk (y)(1 − sk )
k+1 )
≥ k
.
sk − sk−1
sk+1 − sk

Note that Restrictions O and S are jointly required; it is possible for a collection of distributions F1 , ..., FK to satisfy Restriction O, or equivalently Fk ≥ Fk+1 for all k < K, without
satisfying restriction S, which follows from the requirement that Vi |Si = s is stochastically
increasing for all s ∈ [0, 1]. To see this, suppose that Fk−1 (y) = Fk (y) > Fk+1 (y) > 0, which
is admissable under Restriction O. Then the LHS of Restriction S above is identically zero,
but the RHS satisfies
Fk (y)(1 − sk ) − Fk+1 (y)(1 − sk+1 )
Fk (y)(1 − sk ) − Fk (y)(1 − sk+1 )
>
= Fk (y) > 0.
sk+1 − sk
sk+1 − sk
Hence restriction S would fail. Analogously, Restriction S does not imply Restriction O.
Finally, consider Restriction D. Note that, from above,
0 (y)(1 − s
Fk0 (y)(1 − sk ) − Fk+1
1
k+1 )
=
sk+1 − sk
sk+1 − sk

Z

sk+1

F 0 (y|t)dt.

sk

Since the right-hand side must be at least weakly increasing in y for all y ∈ R, so must the
left-hand side, which in turn implies Restriction D.
We next establish that to any λ−1 such that ṽ1 (·|z; λ−1 ), ..., ṽK (·|z; λ−1 ) satisfy all conditions of Theorem 1, there corresponds a structure (λ−1 , F, C) ∈ I. Since we are considering
fixed λ−1 , we suppress λ−1 in notation in what follows, writing simply ṽ1 (·|z), ..., ṽK (·|z).
−1
Note that, by definition, ṽ1 (·|z), ..., ṽK (·|z) satisfy (4) at λ−1 ∈ Λ−1
I ⊂ Λ . Showing existence of (F, C) ∈ F × C such that (λ−1 , F, C) ∈ I is thus equivalent to showing existence of
(F, C) ∈ F × C generating the quantile functions ṽ1 (·|z), ..., ṽK (·|z) implied by λ−1 .
First note that the candidate quantile functions ṽk (·|z) inherit all smoothness properties
of the true quantile functions vk (·|z). By construction,
ṽk (a|z) = bk (a|z) + λ−1 (Rk (a|z)),
and by definition
vk (a|z) = bk (a|z) + λ−1
0 (Rk (a|z)).
Since vk (a|z), bk (a|z) and Rk (a|z) are continuous on [0, 1], so is ṽk (a|z). Since λ−1,0 ∈ [0, 1]
and vk (a|z) is continuously differentiable on at least (0, 1], ṽk (a|z) is also continuous on [0, 1]
and continuously differentiable on at least (0, 1]. Moreover, since ṽk0 (a|z) is bounded away
from zero for all a ∈ (0, 1] by Restriction M, ṽk (·|z) must be strictly monotone, and hence
there exists a unique candidate c.d.f. F̃k (y|z) = ṽk−1 (a|z) implied by ṽk (a|z). In view of the
properties of ṽk0 (a|z) this c.d.f. will have a bounded density f˜k (y|z) (since ṽk0 (a|z) is bounded
away from zero on (0, 1]) which is also locally bounded away from zero except possibly at a = 0
(since ṽk0 (a|z) exists and is bounded everywhere vk0 (a|z) exists and is bounded). Analogously,
the distribution of Vi given Si ≥ sk (z) implied by the candidate quantile function ṽk (a|z) is
as smooth in z as the true quantile function vk (a|z).
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Now let S = {s ∈ [0, 1] : s = sk (z) for some k ∈ K, z ∈ Z}, and recall that if sk (z) =
sl (z 0 ), then by Restriction O we must have ṽk (y|z) = ṽl (y|z 0 ). With slight abuse of notation,
we may therefore define a new collection of candidate quantile functions ṽ(·; s) for s ∈ S by
setting, for each s ∈ S, ṽ(·; s) ≡ ṽk (·|z) for some k, z such that sk (z) = s. Furthermore, as in
Appendix A.3, we may define a new collection of candidate post-entry value c.d.f.s for s ∈ S
by setting F̃ (·; s) = ṽ −1 (·; s).
We first construct a candidate F for F0 . Toward this end, let sl = min S be the minimum
element of S, and let s2 = inf S\{sl } be the infimum of S excluding s1 . Note that, given
this construction, we will have sl = s2 if a continuous instrument z is available, and sl < s2
otherwise. If sl = 0, we take F = F̃ (y; 0), which will belong to F since ṽ(a; 0) will then
inherit the density properties of the ex ante quantile function v0 (a), which by construction
are generated by F ∈ F. Otherwise, let F̃ − (y|Si = s1 ) be the lower bound on F (y|Si = sl )
derived from F̃ (·; ·) following GL as in Appendix A.3:
F̃ − (y|Si = sl ) = lim
t↓s2

F̃ (y; sl )(1 − sl ) − F̃ (y; t)(1 − t)
.
t − sl

Under Restrictions M, O, D, and S, this lower bound F̃ −1 (y|Si = sl ) will be a proper c.d.f.
in y, but generically need not admit a continuous density; for instance, in the Samuelson
(1985) model, F̃ − (y|Si = sl ) may be a step function. However, since the infimum support of
F̃ − (y|Si must, by construction, equal the infimum support of F̃ (y; sl ), we can always find a
candidate F (y|Si = sl ) ≥ F̃ − (y|Si = sl ) with a strictly postive, bounded density everywhere
from zero up to any point weakly below the supremum support of F̃ − (y|Si = sl ). For any
such candidate F (y|Si = sl ) ≥ F̃ − (y|Si = sl ), we may then construct a candidate for F as
F (y) = sl F (y|Si = sl ) + (1 − sl )F̃ (y; sl ).
For any such F (y|Si = sl ), F (y) will be a strictly increasing distribution with support on
[0, v̄], where v̄ = ṽ1 (1; s) is the common support of each selected density implied by Condition
I. Moreover, since the infimum support of F̃ − (y|Si = sl ) is the same as that of F̃ (y; sl ), the
restriction F (y|Si = s1 ) ≥ F̃ − (y|Si = sl ) imposes no constraints below the infimum support
of F̃ − (y|Si = sl ). We may thus freely choose the density of F (y|Si = sl ) at this infimum
support to ensure that F ∈ F.
Fixing F (y) as a candidate for F0 , we next construct a candidate C for C0 as follows. Let
su = sup S, and as in Appendix A.3, for any s ∈ S, let t− (s) and t+ (s) be the nearest upper
and lower neighbors of s in S, adopting the convention that t− (s) = t+ (s) = s if s ∈ S. We
then define C piecewise as follows:
• For s ∈ S, we set C(a, s) ≡ a − (1 − s)F̃ (F −1 (a); s);
• For s ∈ [sl , su ] such that s 6= S, we construct C(a, s) by linear interpolation (in s) of
C(a, ·) between the nearest neighbors C(a, t− (s)) and C(a, t+ (s)).
• For s < sl , we construct C(a, ·) by linear interpolation (in s) between C(a, sl ) and 0:
C(a, s) ≡

s
[a − (1 − sl )F̃ (F −1 (a); sl )];
sl

• Finally, for s > su , we set C(a, s) ≡ a − (1 − s)F̃ (F −1 (a); su ).
By construction, the structure (F, C) reproduces the candidate equilibrium c.d.f.s F̃ (·; s) for
all s ∈ S:
F (y) − C(F (y), s)
F (y) − F (y) + (1 − s)F̃ (y; s)
=
= F̃ (y; s).
1−s
1−s
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It only remains, therefore, to show that C is a joint c.d.f. satisfying our assumptions on
stochastic ordering. Toward this end, note that C satisfies the limit properties of a distribution: C(0, s) = C(a, 0) = 0, C(1, s) = s, C(a, 1) = a. Furthermore, C is continuous
by construction. We thus need only show that C is 2-increasing and that it satisfies our
assumption on stochastic ordering.
Toward this end, we first show that C is 2-increasing. It suffices to restrict attention to
rectangles [a, a0 ] × [s, s0 ] such that either s, s0 < sl , s, s0 > su , or s, s0 ∈ [sl , sl ]. If s, s0 < sl ,
then C(F (y), s) = ssl [F (y) − (1 − sl )F̃ (y; sl )], so that
∂C(F (y 0 ), s)
1
= [F (y) − (1 − sl )F̃ (y; sl )]
∂s
sl
= [sl F (y|Si = sl ) + (1 − sl )F̃ (y; sl ) − (1 − sl )F̃ (y; sl )]
= sl F (y|Si = sl ),
which is clearly nondecreasing in y. Meanwhile, if s, s0 > su , then ∂C(F∂s(y,s)) = F̃ (y; s), which
again is increasing in y. This implies that C is 2-increasing for rectangles with s, s0 < sl
or s, s0 > su . Finally, if s, s0 ∈ [sl , su ], then C(a, ·) is a linear interpolation (in s) between
C(a, t− (s)) ≡ a − F̃ (F −1 (a); t− (s)) · (1 − t− (s)) and C(a, t+ (s)) ≡ a − F̃ (F −1 (a); t+ (s)) · (1 −
t+ (s)) (recalling that for s ∈ Int(S) we have t− (s) = t+ (s) = s). Hence it is sufficient to
verify that if s, s0 ∈ S and s0 > s,
C(a0 , s0 ) − C(a, s0 ) − C(a0 , s) + C(a, s) ≥ 0.
By definition of C(a, s), for all s ∈ S, we have:
C(a, s) = a − F̃ (F −1 (a); s) · (1 − s).
Hence substituting a = F (y), and rearranging the inequality above, C is 2-increasing if:
C(F (y 0 ), s0 ) − C(F (y), s0 ) − C(F (y 0 ), s) + C(F (y), s) ≥ 0
⇔

−F̃ (y 0 ; s0 )(1 − s0 ) + F̃ (y; s0 )(1 − s0 ) + F̃ (y; s)(1 − s) − F̃ (y 0 ; s)(1 − s0 ) ≥ 0,
⇔

F̃ (y; s)(1 − s) − F̃ (y 0 ; s)(1 − s0 ) ≥ F̃ (y 0 ; s0 )(1 − s0 ) − F̃ (y; s0 ) · (1 − s0 ),

where the final line is implied by Restriction D. Hence C is 2-increasing.
Finally, we show that C satisfies stochastic ordering. Toward this end, observe that
stochastic ordering in s is implied by concavity of C(a, s) in s. This in turn follows if for all
s, s0 , s00 ∈ [0, 1] such that s < s0 < s00 , we have
C(F (y), s0 ) − C(F (y), s)
C(F (y), s00 ) − C(F (y), s0 )
≥
.
0
s −s
s00 − s0
For s, s0 , s00 ∈ S, we may rewrite this inequality as
(1 − s)F̃ (y; s) − (1 − s0 )F̃ (y; s)
(1 − s0 )F̃ (y; s0 ) − (1 − s00 )F̃ (y; s00 )
≥
s0 − s
s00 − s0
which holds immediately by Restriction S. In view of our linear interpolation scheme for
C(a, s), this conclusion extends immediately to s, s0 , s00 in the interval [sl , su ], but not necessarily in S. Finally, for s < sl , C(F (y), s) is linear in s with slope
dC(F (y), s)
F̃ (y; sl )(1 − sl ) − F̃ (y; t)(1 − t)
= lim
,
+
ds
t − sl
t↓t (sl )
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while for s > su , C(F (y), s) is linear in s with slope F̃ (y; su ). Again in view of Condition
S, it follows that the inequality above also extends to s, s0 , s00 potentially outside of [sl , su ].
Hence C satisfies stochastic ordering.
We have thus constructed a candidate structure (F, C) reproducing ṽ1 , ..., ṽK and satisfying all properties on (F0 , C0 ) except differentiability of C over the domain assumed in
Assumption 4, which may not hold since our construction involves kinds at transition points
s ∈ S which are not in the interior of S. But since, by construction, such nondifferentiabilities can only arise on the boundaries of the equilibrium support S, we may slightly
perturbing C(a, s) to smooth transitions at these transition points while still reproducing all
observed selected densities. One can construct a copula satisfying the properties above plus
differentiability where required; i.e. all conditions required by C. This establishes the claim.
Proof of Corollary 1. Given in the main text.
Proof of Corollary 2. For the first statement, suppose there exist distinct k, l ∈ K and
z, z 0 ∈ Z such that sk (z) = sl (z 0 ) = s̄, and observe that if the support of Vi |Si = sk (z)
includes zero, then we must have Rk (0|z) = 0. Identification of λ−1
0 on its empirical do0
main [0, maxa max{Rk (a|z), Rl (a|z )] follows directly from GPV (2009) as in the main text.
This immediately yields identification of Fk (·|z) (which by construction must be the same as
Fl (·|z)) through (4). This establishes the first statement in Corollary 2.
For the second statement, further suppose that sk (z) ∈ (0, 1) and that z, z 0 ∈ Int(Z).
For any v ∈ (vk (0|z), v̄), our assumptions on C0 imply F (v|Si ≥ s) is differentiable in s for
all s ≤ sk (z), and the conditional distribution F (v|Si = sk (z)) is related to the selected
distribution Fk (v|z) by the identity


d
F (v|Si = sk (z)) ≡ −
.
(1 − s)F (v|Si ≥ s)
ds
s=sk (z)
Recall that c(z) is continuous and strictly monotone in z. Furthermore, by hypothesis, both
z ∈ Int(Z) and z 0 ∈ Int(Z). Finally, since c(z) is continuous and strictly increasing in z
and sk (z) = sl (z) ∈ (0, 1), both sk (z) and sl (z) are continuous and strictly increasing in z.
Hence for any  > 0, there must exist z̃, z̃ 0 ∈ Z such that both sk (z̃) ∈ (sk (z) − , sk (z)) and
sk (z̃) = sl (z̃ 0 ). Choose any such z̃, z̃ 0 , and note that Fk (·|z̃) is then also identified by the
arguments above. Moreover, by definition,


d
(1 − sk (z))Fk (v|z) − (1 − sk (z̃))Fk (v|z̃)
(1 − s)F (v|Si ≥ s)
=
+ o(),
ds
sk (z̃) − sk (z̃)
s=sk (z)
where our choice of z̃, z̃ 0 implies that all terms on the right-hand side are identified. Repeating
this construction over any sequence of  such that  ↓ 0 implies identification of F (v|Si =
sk (z)) for all v ∈ (vk (0|z), v̄). Since F (·|Si = sk (z)) is right-continuous, identification of
F (v|Si = sk (z)) for all v ∈ (vk (0|z), v̄) implies identification of F (vk (0|z)|Si = sk (z)), and
since vk (0|z) must be the infimum support of F (·|Si = sk (z)), we must have F (v|Si =
sk (z)) = 0 for all v < vk (0|z). Finally, by definition, F (v|Si = sk (z)) = 1 for v ≥ v̄. Thus
F (v|Si = sk (z)) is identified for all v ∈ [vk (0|z), v̄].
Proof of Corollary 3. Consider any k ∈ K, and let R̄k (1) ≡ supz∈Z Rk (1|z) and Rk (1) ≡
inf z∈Z Rk (1|z). Temporarily assume that Rk (1) < R̄k (1); we establish that this holds under
the conditions of Corollary 3 below. Note that since c(z) is continuous in z, Rk (1|z) is
continuous in z. Since we have assumed that z, if continuous, is supported on an interval, for
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each r ∈ (Rk (1), R̄k (1)) we can find z 0 ∈ Z such that r = Rk (1|z). Moreover, by Restriction
I of Theorem 1, we must have for any λ−1 ∈ Λ−1
I :
bk (1|z) − bl (1|z 0 ) = λ−1 (Rk (1|z 0 )) − λ−1 (Rk (1|z)).

(25)

Now pick any r0 ∈ [Rk (1), R̄k (1)], and consider any  > 0. From above, we can find z, z 0 ∈ Z
such that Rk (1|z) 6= Rk (1|z 0 ), |Rk (1|z) − r0 | <  and |Rk (1|z 0 ) − r0 | < . For any such z, z 0 ,
taking a first-order Taylor series approximation to λ−1 (r) around r0 in (25) will imply
λ−1,0 (r0 ) =

bk (1|z) − bl (1|z 0 )
+ o().
Rk (1|z 0 ) − Rk (1|z)

The right-hand side of this expression is well-defined and identified up to the residual o().
Furthermore, this construction may be repeated for progressively smaller  > 0 to obtain a
sequence of identified right-hand terms, which will converge to λ−1,0 (r0 ) as  → 0. It follows
that, so long as Rk (1) < R̄k (1), a continuous instrument z will yield identification of λ−1,0 (r0 )
for any r0 ∈ [Rk (1), R̄k (1)].
It only remains, therefore, to show that the conditions in Corollary 3 imply Rk (1) < R̄k (1).
Note that, by definition, Rk (1) ≤ R̄k (1), and we can have Rk (1) = R̄k (1) if and only if
Rk (1|z) = Rk (1|z 0 ) for all z, z 0 ∈ Z, which by Condition I of Theorem 1 holds if and only
if bk (1|z) = bk (1|z 0 ) for all z, z 0 ∈ Z. But as shown by LLZ (2015), the equilibrium bidding
strategy β(·|N, s̄) is strictly decreasing in s̄ for v > 0. Since z affects bidding only through
sk (z), we can thus have bk (1|z) = bk (1|z 0 ) for all z, z 0 ∈ Z only if sk (z) = sk (z 0 ) for all
z, z 0 ∈ Z. But since c(z) is strictly increasing in z, we also know that sk (z) is strictly
increasing in z whenever sk (z) ∈ (0, 1). Thus, if sk (z) ∈ (0, 1) for some z ∈ Int(Z), we can
find z 0 > z such that z 0 ∈ Z and sk (z 0 ) > sk (z), which from above implies that we cannot
have Rk (1|z) = Rk (1|z 0 ) for all z, z 0 ∈ Z.
Proof of Corollary 4. Consider any k, l ∈ K and z, z 0 ∈ Z such that Rk (1|z) 6= Rl (1|z 0 ). With
slight abuse of notation, define R̄k = Rk (1|z), R̄l = Rl (1|z 0 ), b̄k = bk (1|z), and b̄l = bl (1|z 0 ).
Suppose WLOG that R̄k > R̄l , and recall that this implies b̄k < b̄l .
First suppose that U0 belongs to the CRRA family. In this case λ−1
0 (x) = x/(1 − γ0 ).
Equation (11) then simplifies to
b̄k + R̄k /(1 − γ0 ) = b̄k + R̄l /(1 − γ0 ).
This is a linear equation in 1/(1 − γ0 ), which has a unique solution since R̄k > R̄l . Since
1/(1 − γ0 ) is monotone, it follows that γ0 is identified.
Alternatively suppose that U0 belongs to the CARA family. Then λ−1
0 (x) = x if γ0 = 0,
or λ−1
(x)
=
[ln(γ
x
+
1)]/γ
otherwise.
We
consider
each
case
in
turn.
0
0
0
First suppose that, in truth, γ0 = 0. Then, from Corollary 1, no strictly risk averse model
can satisfy (11). Since the CARA model is strictly risk averse for every γ0 > 0, it follows
that γ0 is identified.
Now suppose that γ0 > 0. Then from above λ−1 (x; γ) = [ln(γx + 1)]/γ. Differentiating
1
with respect to x yields λ−1,0 (x; γ) = γx+1
, which is strictly decreasing in γ for x > 0. By
−1
definition, the change in λ (x; γ) over the interval [R̄l , R̄k ] is
Z R̄k
1
∆λ−1 (γ) =
dx,
γx
+1
R̄l
which is identified up to γ and strictly decreasing in γ since the integrand is strictly decreasing
in γ (bearing in mind that R̄l > 0). Finally, by (11), we must have b̄l − b̄k = ∆λ−1 (γ0 ). The
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right-hand side is identified, and the left-hand side is known up to γ0 and strictly decreasing
in γ0 . It follows that γ0 is identified.
Proof of Theorem 2. For each k ∈ K and θ ∈ Θ, let b̃k,θ (·), R̃k,θ (·) be the functions obtained
when bk (·), Rk (·) are reindexed according to hkθ (·):
b̃k,θ (a) ≡ bk (hkθ (a)),
R̃k,θ (a) ≡ Rk (hkθ (a)).
Now consider any θ ∈ ΘI and k, l ∈ K such that Conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 2
hold. We first show that, under Condition (ii) of Theorem 2, reindexed bid functions b̃k,θ , b̃l,θ
can intersect at most on a closed set of Lebesgue measure zero. We then proceed to establish
the main result.
Lemma 1. Suppose that θ ∈ ΘI and that the set of points a ∈ [0, 1] such that (Nk −
1)H(a, sk ; θ) = (Nl − 1)H(a, sl ; θ) is of Lebesgue measure zero. Let Bkl,θ = {a ∈ [0, 1] :
b̃k,θ (a) = b̃l,θ (a)}. Then Bkl,θ is a closed set of Lebesgue measure zero.
Proof. First note that, since θ ∈ ΘI , there must exist some Fθ ∈ F and λθ ∈ Λ such
that, for all k ∈ K, the observed equilibrium bid quantile function bk (a) equals the predicted
equilibrium bid quantile function under (θ, Fθ , λθ ). Let Fk,θ denote the selected c.d.f. implied
by (θ, Fθ , λθ ), which in view of (1) must satisfy
(1 − sk )Fk,θ (y) = Fθ (y) − C(Fθ (y), sk ; θ).
From this, letting fk,θ be the density of Fk,θ (y), and fθ be the density of Fθ , it follows that
1 − C1 (Fk,θ (y), sk ; θ)
(1 − sk )fk,θ (y)
=
fθ (y)
sk + (1 − sk )Fk,θ (y)
sk + Fk,θ (y) − C(Fk,θ (y), sk ; θ)
= H(Fθ (y), sk ; θ)fθ (y).
Now let βk,θ (y) denote the equilibrium bid function implied by primitives (θ, Fθ , λθ ) given
sk . For all y ∈ [vθ (0), vθ (1)], βk,θ (y) is uniquely defined by the IVP
0
(y) = λθ (y − βk,θ (y))
βk,θ

(Nk − 1)(1 − sk )fk,θ (y)
sk + (1 − sk )Fk,θ (y)

= λθ (y − βk,θ (y))(Nk − 1)H(Fθ (y), sk ; θ)fθ (y),
subject to the boundary condition βk,θ (vθ (1)) = 0. Furthermore, since (θ, Fθ , λθ ) must reproduce bk (a), we must have bk (a) = βk,θ (vk,θ (a)), or equivalently
b̃k,θ (a) ≡ bk (hk (a; θ)) = βk,θ (vθ (a)),
where the last identity follows since, by definition of hk (a, θ), vθ (a) = vk,θ (hk (a; θ)).
We now show that Bkl,θ is a closed set of measure zero. Closedness of Bkl,θ follows directly
from the fact that b̃k,θ (·), b̃l,θ (·) are continuous. To show that Bkl,θ is of measure zero, we first
0
show that the set Bkl,θ
= {a ∈ [0, 1] : b̃k,θ (a) = b̃l,θ (a) and b̃0k,θ (a) = b̃0l,θ (a)} is of measure
zero. We then show that Bkl,θ is also of measure zero.
0 . In view of the identity β (v (a)) = b̃ (a), we may apply the change
First consider Bkl,θ
k θ
k,θ
of variables y = vθ (a) to re-express the FOC defining βk,θ (y) as
b̃k,θ (a) = λθ (vθ (a) − b̃k,θ (a))(Nk − 1)H(a, sk ; θ).
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Moreover, for a > 0, we must have vθ (a) > b̃k,θ (a) and hence λθ (vθ (a) − b̃k,θ (a)) > 0. It
follows that, for a > 0 we can have both b̃k,θ (a) = b̃l,θ (a) and b̃0k,θ (a) = b̃0l,θ (a) if and only if
(Nk − 1)H(a, sk ; θ) = (Nl − 1)H(a, sl ; θ). By hypothesis, the latter can hold on at most a set
0
of measure zero, hence Bkl,θ
must be of measure zero.
0 , where
Now consider Bkl,θ . By definition, we may partition Bkl,θ into disjoint subsets Bkl,θ
0 )c , where b̃ (a) = b̃ (a) but b̃0 (a) 6= b̃0 (a).
b̃k,θ (a) and b̃l,θ (a) are tangent, and Bkl,θ ∩(Bkl,θ
k,θ
l,θ
k,θ
l,θ
0
0 )c , we have
From above, Bkl,θ is of measure zero. Meanwhile, for every a0 ∈ Bkl,θ ∩ (Bkl,θ
by definition b̃0l,θ (a) 6= b̃0k,θ (a). Hence there must exist some  > 0 such that for all a ∈
0 )c is at most
[a0 − , a0 ) ∩ (a0 , a0 + ], we have b̃k,θ (a) 6= b̃l,θ (a). It follows that Bkl,θ ∩ (Bkl
countable, and thus of Lebesgue measure zero.
We now establish the main claim that λ−1 is point-identified up to θ. Toward this end,
define r̄k ≡ maxa R̃k,θ (a), r̄kl ≡ max{r̄k , r̄l } as in the main text, and let functions R̄kl,θ (·),
Rkl,θ (·) be the pointwise maximum and minimum of R̃k,θ (·), R̃l,θ (·) respectively:
R̄kl,θ (a) ≡ max{R̃k,θ (a), R̃l,θ (a)},

(26)

Rkl,θ (a) ≡ min{R̃k,θ (a), R̃l,θ (a)}.

(27)

For each r ∈ [0, r̄kl ], let Akl,θ (r) be the set all decreasing sequences {αt }∞
t=1 satisfying the
recursive relationship
R̄kl,θ (α0 ) ≡ r,

R̄kl,θ (αt ) = Rkl,θ (αt−1 ) for t = 1, 2, ....

(28)

Note the following properties of Akl,θ (r):
Lemma 2. For any k, l ∈ {1, ..., K} and any r ∈ [0, r̄kl ], Akl,θ (r) is nonempty. Furthermore,
t
for all sequences {αt }∞
t=1 ∈ Akl,θ (r), limt→∞ α ∈ Bkl,θ .
Proof. First show that 0 ∈ Bkl,θ . By Theorem 3, when vk (0) = 0 for all k, which is implied
by condition (i) of Theorem 2, we have β(0|Nk , s̄) = 0 for all s̄ ∈ [0, 1) and k ∈ K. Hence if
θ ∈ ΘI , we must have Rk (0) = 0 for all k ∈ K. Furthermore, for any k, l ∈ K and any θ, we
have hk,θ (0) = hl,θ (0) = 0 and therefore 0 ∈ Bkl,θ .
Next, following GPV (2009), observe that both R̄kl,θ and Rkl,θ are continuous, with R̄kl,θ
having range [0, r̄kl ]. Choose any r0 ∈ [0, r̄kl ]. Since r0 ∈ [0, r̄kl ], by the Intermediate Value
Theorem there exists α ∈ [0, 1] such that R̄kl,θ = α. Choose any such α, set α0 = α, and set
r1 = Rkl,θ (α0 ). Note that R̄kl,θ is continuous on [0, α0 ], with R̄kl,θ (α0 ) ≥ r1 . Hence again by
the intermediate value theorem there exists α1 ∈ [0, α¯0 ] such that R̄kl,θ (α1 ) = r1 and α1 ≤ α0 .
Iterating the argument establishes existence of a decreasing sequence {αt }∞
t=0 ∈ Akl,θ .
∞
Finally show that any sequence {αt }t=0 ∈ Akl,θ converges to a limit ā ∈ Bkl,θ . Clearly, if
∞
∞
{αt }∞
t=0 ∈ Akl,θ then {αt }t=0 is a decreasing sequence bounded below by 0. Hence {αt }t=0
converges to some limit ā. Furthermore, by definition, we must have limt→∞ R̄kl,θ (αt ) =
limt→∞ Rkl,θ (αt ). Hence ā ∈ Bkl,θ , establishing the claim.
Now let φ be any continuous, increasing, zero-at origin function on [0, r̄kl ] satisfying the
compatibility condition
b̃k,θ (a) + φ(R̃k,θ (a)) = b̃l,θ (a) + φ(R̃l,θ (a)) ∀a ∈ [0, 1].

(29)

If no such φ exists, then θ ∈
/ ΘI , a contradiction. Otherwise, choose any such φ and rearrange
(29) to obtain for any a ∈ [0, 1]
φ(R̃k,θ (a)) − φ(R̃l,θ (a)) = b̃l,θ (a) − b̃k,θ (a).
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Since φ is continuous, increasing, and satisfies (29), this expression in turn implies
φ(R̄kl,θ (a)) = |b̃k,θ (a) − b̃l,θ (a)| + φ(Rkl,θ (a)).
Next consider any r0 ∈ [0, r̄kl ], and let α0 = min{a ∈ [0, 1] : R̄kl,θ (a) = r0 }. Let {αt }∞
t=0
be any sequence in Akl,θ (r0 ) whose first term is α0 . Recall that by definition {αt }∞
t=0 satisfies
R̄kl,θ (αt+1 ) = Rkl,θ (αt ) for all t. Thus for any t
φ(R̄kl,θ (αt )) = |b̃k,θ (αt ) − b̃l,θ (αt )| + φ(R̄kl,θ (αt+1 )).

(30)

Noting that r0 ≡ R̄kl,θ (α0 ) and recursively substituting into (30), we therefore conclude
φ(r0 ) =

∞
X

|b̃k,θ (αt ) − b̃l,θ (αt )| + φ(R̄kl,θ ( lim αt )),
t→∞

t=0

(31)

From above, limt→∞ αt ∈ Bkl,θ . Moreover, if α0 ∈
/ Bkl,θ , then limt→∞ αt < α0 .
We now show that recursive constructions of the form (31) uniquely determine φ on
[0, r̄kl ]. Toward this end, recall from Lemma 1 that Bkl,θ is a closed set of Lebesgue measure
c
c
is an open set
denote the complement of Bkl,θ in [0, 1], Bkl,θ
zero. Hence, letting Bkl,θ
c
relative to [0, 1] with full Lebesgue measure on [0, 1]. Since Bkl,θ is open, it is the union of
a countable collection of disjoint open (relative to [0, 1]) intervals in [0, 1]. We denote this
collection of open intervals by {Om }m∈M , indexed by a countable set M. For each m ∈ M,
−
−
let a+
m = sup Om and am = inf Om . Note that, since 0 ∈ Bkl,θ , we have am ∈ Bkl,θ for all
+
m ∈ Om , and we also have a+
m ∈ Bkl,θ unless am = 1.
Now let AI be the set of closed intervals I ⊂ [0, 1] (with nonempty interior) such that, for
each I ∈ AI both R̄kl,θ (a) and Rkl,θ (a) are strictly increasing on I, and I contains at least
0 (0) > 0 and R̃0 (0) > 0, and 0 ∈ B
one element of Bkl,θ . Note that since R̃k,θ
kl,θ , at least one
l,θ
such interval exists. Suppose that there exist two solutions φ1 , φ2 to (29). We first show that
φ1 (R̄kl,θ (a)) and φ2 (R̄kl,θ (a)) must coincide up to a constant κI on each interval I ∈ AI . We
then show that this implies φ1 (r0 ) = φ2 (r0 ) for all r0 ∈ [0, r̄kl ].
First consider any I ∈ AI . By definition, both R̄kl,θ (a) and Rkl,θ (a) are strictly increasing
on I, and I contains at least one element ā ∈ Bkl,θ . Choose any α0 ∈ I such that α0 ∈ Om
0
for some m ∈ M. If α0 > ā, then since both R̄kl,θ and Rkl,θ are strictly increasing on [a−
m, α ]
−
t
∞
0
−
and R̄kl,θ (am ) = Rkl,θ (am ), we may form a decreasing sequence {α }t=1 starting from α such
0
that R̄kl,θ (αt+1 ) = Rkl,θ (αt ) and αt → a−
m ≥ ā. Otherwise, if α > ā, then we may form an
t+1
t
t
∞
increasing sequence {α }t=1 such that Rkl,θ (α ) = R̄kl,θ (α ) and αt → a+
m ≤ ā. In either
+ ], we will ultimately be able to express the integral
case, for every al , au ∈ I ∩ [a−
,
a
m m
Z

R̄kl,θ (au )

φ0i (r) dr

Rkl,θ (al )

as a limit of identified sums of bids by recursively applying (31) and taking appropriate
limits. Furthermore, for all r such that r ∈ [Rkl,θ (a), R̄kl,θ (a)] for some a ∈ I, we may take
countable sums of such integrals to express both φ1 (r) as identified up to φ1 (R̄kl,θ (ā)) and
φ2 (r) as identified up to φ1 (R̄kl,θ (ā)), since the open sets {Om ∩ I}m∈M have full Lebesgue
measure on I. From this, it follows that we must have φ1 (R̄kl,θ (a)) = φ2 (R̄kl,θ (a)) + κI for all
a ∈ I, where κI is an unknown constant potentially varying with I ∈ AI . Note that any two
intervals I1 , I2 which have nonempty intersection must have κI1 = κI2 . Furthermore, since
by definition each I ∈ AI has nonempty interior and thus positive measure, there can be at
most countably many mutually disjoint elements of AI , and thus at most countably many
distinct values of κI .
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Now choose any r0 ∈ [0, r̄kl ], and let α0 (r0 ) = α0 = min{a ∈ [0, 1] : R̄kl,θ (a) = r̄kl }.
t+1 = min{a ∈ [0, 1] :
Consider the sequence {αt }∞
t=1 formed by taking, at every step, α
R̄kl,θ (a) = Rkl,θ (αt )}, and let a(r0 ) = limt→∞ αt .18 If R̄kl,θ (a) < R̄kl,θ (a(r0 )) for all a < α0 ,
stop. Otherwise, update α0 = min{a ∈ [0, 1] : R̄kl,θ (a) = R̄kl,θ (a(r0 )), form a new sequence
αt+1 starting from this α0 as above, let a(r0 ) be the limit of this sequence, and repeat
this process until no further progress is possible. Applying (31) across these sequences, for
i ∈ {1, 2}, we will eventually be able to express φi (r0 ) as a limit of identified sums of bids,
plus the trailing constant φi (R̄kl,θ (a(α0 ))). Moreover, by construction, for any a < a(r0 ),
we must have R̄kl,θ (a) < R̄kl,θ (a(α0 )); since R̄kl,θ (a) is continuous, this implies that R̄kl,θ (a)
must be strictly increasing on some interval [a(r0 ) − δ̄, a(r0 )] with δ̄ > 0. Furthermore, we
have that Rkl,θ < R̄kl,θ almost everywhere, that Rkl,θ (ā) = R̄kl,θ (ā), and that R̄kl,θ (a) is
strictly increasing on [a(r0 ) − δ̄, a(r0 )]. Hence Rkl,θ (a) must also be strictly increasing on
[a(r0 ) − δ, a(r0 )] for some δ > 0. But then, by definition, a(r0 ) ∈ I for some I ∈ AI .
Let κI (r0 ) denote the constant associated with this I, and note that κI (r0 ) is a welldefined function of r0 since every step in the construction of a(r0 ) is unique, and since every
I ∈ AI containing a(r0 ) must intersect. Moreover, from above, we have φ1 (R̄kl,θ (a(r0 ))) =
φ2 (R̄kl,θ (a(r0 ))) + κI (r0 ), implies that we must also φ1 (r0 ) = φ2 (r0 ) + κI (r0 ). Since r0 was
arbitrary, this relationship must hold for all r0 ∈ [0, r̄kl ]. By hypothesis, φ1 (r0 ) − φ2 (r0 ) is
a continuous function of r0 , which means that κI (r0 ) must also be continuous. But from
above, κI (r0 ) can take at most countably many values. Both of these conditions can hold
simultaneously only if κI (r0 ) is constant for all r0 ∈ [0, r̄kl ]. In particular, since φ1 (0) =
φ2 (0) = 0, we must have κI (r0 ) = 0 for all r ∈ [0, r̄kl ]. From this, we conclude that φ1 = φ2 .
Lastly, showing that so long as there exists at least one k, l ∈ K satisfying conditions (i)
−1
and (ii) at θ ∈ ΘI , there exist unique (λ−1
θ , Fθ ) ∈ Λ [0, maxk∈K r̄k ] × F satisfying (4) at θ.
By construction, if θ ∈ ΘI , there must exist at least one such (λ−1
θ , Fθ ). By definition, any
candidate Fθ rationalizing bid-stage behavior must satisfy (4) at the given k, l which implies
in particular that the quantile function vθ (a) implied by Fθ must satisfy
vθ (a) = b̃k,θ (a) + λ−1
kl,θ (R̃k,θ (a)), ∀a ∈ [0, 1].
But we have shown that λ−1
kl,θ is uniquely identified (up to θ) from which it follows that vθ (a)
is identified up to θ, or equivalently that Fθ is identified up to θ. Moreover, since θ ∈ ΘI ,
−1
the same (vθ , λ−1
θ ) must satisfy (4) for all l ∈ K, which implies for any λθ ,
vθ (a) − b̃l,θ (a) = λ−1
θ (R̃l,θ (a)) ∀a ∈ [0, 1], l ∈ K.
But we have already shown that vθ is uniquely identified up to θ, in which case, varying a,
we will eventually be able to trace out λ−1
θ (r) for all r ∈ [0, r̄l ]. This holds for any l, implying
−1
−1
that λθ is unique within Λ [0, maxk r̄k ]. This completes the proof.

Appendix C: Computational details
This Appendix provides a detailed description of our numerical implementation of the procedures described in Section 4. Our implementation is in the Julia programming language,
and the code is available from the authors upon request.19
18

If α0 (r0 ) ∈ Bkl,θ , this may be a constant sequence.
If not published along with the paper, we ultimately intend to make a condensed and annotated version of our
code available on Matthew Gentry’s website (http://www.matthewgentry.net).
19

45

Evaluating the sample likelihood
As described in Section 4, we implement estimation as a conditional maximum likelihood
problem, where the likelihood contribution of individual i in auction l is given by the likelihood of observing outcomes (eil , bil ) given Nl . Our strategy for evaluating this sample
likelihood involves three key elements: partial discretization of observed bids, a Chebyshev
collocation strategy for solving equilibrium bid functions, and substitution from the equilibrium bid FOC in evaluating exact (non-discretized) bid observations. Combined, these result
in a fast, stable evaluator for the sample likelihood, which additionally yields exact analytic
gradients. We next describe each element in turn.
We first translate exact bids bil into partially discretized bids b̈il as follows. For each
competition level k = 1, ..., K, let b̄k denote the maximum bid observed at competition level
k
k. We define a (Jk + 1)-element discretized bid grid B k = {Bj }Jj=0
for level k, where Jk
is the is the largest integer such that 0.01Jk ≤ b̄k − 0.05, and each element Bj = 0.01j (so
that elements Bj are spaced with step 0.01 on the interval [0, BJk ]); bearing in mind that
valuations are distributed on [0, 1], this is a relatively fine grid. We then replace each observed
bid bil with a partially discretized bid b̈il , defined as b̈il = bil if bil > B̄ k , and b̈il equal to
the upper endpoint of its associated bid interval within the discrete grid B k otherwise. By
discretizing low bids, we greatly reduce the number of distinct points at which the sample log
likelihood needs to be evaluated, while by keeping high bids, we preserve exact information
for bids close to the maximum, which we expect to be particularly informative in view of our
identification results. Through numerical experiments, we found that the maximum BJk had
very little impact on either identified sets or profiled likelihood results.
Let g̈k (·|ψ) be the density of discretized bids b̈il implied by symmetric equilibrium bidding
strategies given parameters ψ against competition Nk . After discretizing bids, we may then
write the individual log-likelihood function generically as
`il (ψ) = (1 − eil ) log skl + eil [log(1 − skl ) + log g̈kl (b̈il |ψ)],

(32)

where the first term represents the likelihood contribution of a bidder who does not enter, and
the second represents that of a bidder who enters and submits discretized bid b̈il conditional
on entry.
In order to evaluate (32), we must first solve for the equilibrium bid functions β1 (v|ψ), ..., βK (v|ψ)
implied by parameters ψ. Toward this end, first observe that we can express each βk (·|ψ)
as the solution to a scale-normalized differential equation on [0, 1], scaled by the maximum
value v̄. Let λ̃ and F̃k be defined as in the main text:
λ̃(u) ≡ u +

Q
X

γj Bj,Q (u),

u ∈ [0, 1]

j=0

F̃k (u) ≡

P
X

φk,j Bj,P (u),

u ∈ [0, 1],

j=0

i.e., the shape components of the parameterizations of λ and Fk defined on the interval [0, 1],
with both the range and the domain of λ̃ and the domain of F̃k scaled by v̄ to obtain our
final parameterizations λ(x) = v̄ λ̃−1 (v̄ −1 x) and Fk (x) = F̃k (v̄ −1 x). Let β̃k (u|ψ) denote the
solution to the following scale-normalized differential equation (DE) on [0, 1]:
β̃k0 (u|ψ) = λ̃ u − βk (u|ψ̄)) ·
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(Nk − 1)(1 − sk )f˜k (u)
,
sk + (1 − sk )F̃k (u)

(33)

subject to the boundary condition β̃k (0|ψ) = 0. Then the true equilibrium bid function
βk (y|ψ) on [0, v̄] may be obtained by scaling both the range and the domain of β̃k (u|ψ) by
v̄: βk (y|ψ) = v̄ β̃k (v̄ −1 y|ψ). This has two practical advantages. First, we can try multiple
candidates for v̄ without needing to re-solve (33). Second, we can guarantee that the loglikelihood is well-defined by restricting attention to v̄ ≥ b̄k /β̃k (1|ψ). The MCMC algorithm
we employ below takes advantage of this fact to eliminate “wasted” parameter trials for which
v̄ β̃k (1|ψ) < b̄k and the log-likelihood is negative infinite.
It remains to solve the DE (33) for the scale-normalized bid function β̃k (·|ψ). We approach
this via Chebyshev collocation. For each k = 1, ..., K, we first approximate each normalized
bid function β̃k (·|ψ) with an Rth order Chebyshev polynomial:
β̃k (u|ψ) =

R+1
X

ck,r Tr (u) ,

r=1

where Tr (u) denotes the rth-order Chebyshev polynomial with domain rescaled to the interval
[0, 1]. We then choose the R + 1 unknown coefficients (ck,1 , ..., ck,R+1 ) in this approximation
to satisfy the system of R + 1 Chebyshev collocation equations
!
R+1
R+1
X
X
(Nk − 1)(1 − sk )f˜k (ul )
ck,r Tr0 (ul ) ≡ λ̃ ul −
ck,r Tr (ul )
, l = 1, ..., R + 1, (34)
sk + (1 − sk )F̃k (ul )
r=1
r=1
where {ul }R+1
l=1 are the nodes of the collocation system. Since we wish to enforce boundary
conditions exactly, we take nodes u1 = 0 and uR+1 = 1, with remaining interior nodes
u2 , ..., uR equal to the zeros of the (R − 1)th order Chebyshev polynomial TR−1 (·), rescaled
to the domain [0, 1]:


1
2l − 1
1
ul ≡ cos
π + , l = 2, ..., R − 1.
2
2(R − 2)
2
This yields a fast, stable solution to (33) with two additional practical advantages. First,
analytical derivatives of each equilibrium bid function βk (·|ψ) in ψ may be obtained by applying the implicit function theorem to the Chebyshev collocations (34). Second, one can
reinterpret the Chebyshev collocation equations (34) as auxiliary constraints in a Mathematical Programming with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) framing of the MLE problem, as
we do in implementing CCT Procedures 2 and 3.
Finally, having solved for each equilibrium bid function βk (·|ψ), we can evaluate the semidiscretized bid density g̈k (·|ψ) appearing in the log-likelihood (32). Let ũk (b|ψ) be the inverse
of the normalized bid function β̃k (·|ψ), which in view of our Chebyshev collocation strategy
we may define implicitly as the solution to
v̄ −1 b =

R+1
X

ck,r Tr (ũk (b|ψ)) .

r=1

We express g̈k (b̈il |ψ) in terms of ũk (b̈il |ψ) and other parameters as follows. If b̈il ≤ BJk , we
have bil ∈ (Bj−1 , Bj ] or equivalently b̈il = Bj for some j = 1, ..., Jk , so that g̈k takes the
discrete form
g̈k (b̈il |ψ) = Gk (Bj |ψ) − Gk (Bj−1 |ψ) = F̃k (ũk (Bj |ψ)) − F̃k (ũk (Bj−1 |ψ)).
Meanwhile, for b̈il > B̄ k , we have b̈il = bil , in which case g̈kl (b̈il |ψ) is equal to the original
equilibrium bid density gk (bil |ψ), and we have
ln g̈k (b̈il |ψ) = ln fk (βk−1 (b̈il |ψ)) + ln βk−1,0 (b̈il |ψ),
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which after substitution from the normalized bid DE (33) we may re-express as


ln g̈k (b̈il |ψ) = − ln λ̃ ũk (b̈il |ψ) − v̄ −1 b̈il + ln v̄ −1


− ln(Nk − 1) + ln sk + (1 − sk )F̃k ũk (b̈il |ψ)) .
In both cases, we may express ln g̈k (·|ψ) as a closed form up to the normalized inverse bid
function ũk (b|ψ). In turn, given our Chebyshev collocation strategy for solving equilibrium
bids, evaluation of ũk (b̈il |ψ) reduces to finding the unique root of a polynomial equation on
a bounded interval, which can be achieved quickly and easily using either Newton-Raphson
or other numerical root-finding equations. Combining these methods, we ultimately obtain
a log-likelihood which can be evaluated very efficiently (a few hundredths of a second in our
simulations), and for which analytic gradients in the parameters ψ can easily be obtained by
applying the implicit function theorem.

Evaluating Kullback-Leibler divergence
We evaluate Kullback-Leibler divergence DKL (ψ||ψ 0 ) from ψ to ψ 0 using essentially the same
partial grid strategy as above, but now integrating with respect to the true density of observables at ψ. Specifically, let g̈k (·|ψ) be the discretized bid density defined above. First
consider the KL divergence between the distribution of observables (ei , b̈i ) conditional on Nk
implied by parameters ψ to that implied by parameters ψ 0 . Simplifying the definition of KL
divergence, we may express this as follows:
DKL,k (ψ||ψ 0 ) = sk (log sk − log s0k ) + (1 − sk )(log(1 − sk ) − log(1 − s0k ))
Z h
i
0
+ (1 − sk )
log g̈k (B̈|ψ) − log g̈k (B̈|ψ ) dG̈k (B̈|ψ). (35)
B̈

For ease of interpretation, we rescale each DKL,k (ψ||ψ 0 ) by 1/(1−sk ), such that DKL,k (ψ||ψ 0 )
now represents the expected log-likelihood loss per bid observed at competition Nk , when the
log-likelihood is evaluated at parameters ψ 0 and P
true parameters are ψ. We then compute
K
0
0
overall scaled KL divergence as DKL (ψ||ψ ) =
k=1 DKL,k (ψ||ψ ). The resulting scaled
0
measure DKL (ψ||ψ ) reflects the average loss in sample log-likelihood at parameters ψ 0 per
unit of sample scale M ; i.e., per bid observed at each competition level. So, for example, if
scaled DKL (ψ||ψ 0 ) = 10−4 , then a sample of M = 10000 bids per competition level would be
required to generate an expected sample log likelihood loss of −1 at parameters ψ 0 relative
to true parameters ψ. In our main specifications, we take scaled DKL (ψ||ψ 0 ) ≤ 10−5.0
as numerically equivalent, implying that M = 100, 000 bids per competition level would
generate an average loss of −1.

MPEC algorithms for profile likelihood and KL divergence
We solve profiled likelihood and Kullback-Leibler problems using a Mathematical Programming with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) algorithm inspired by Su and Judd (2012).
Specifically, let ck denote the vector of coefficients in the Chebyshev approximation to βk (·),
and c = {c1 , ..., cK } collect these coefficients across competition levels k. For example, in
computing the profiled likelihood function L̃η (η0 ), we solve
L̃η (η0 ) = max L(ψ, c)
ψ,c

subject to the following constraints:
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Profile constraints η(ψ) = η0 ;
Admissible parameters ψ ∈ Ψ;
PR+1
−1
Maximum bid
r=1 ck,r Tr,R (1) ≥ v̄ b̄k for all k = 1, ..., K;
MPEC For each k = 1, ..., K, (ck , ψ) satisfy the Chebyshev collocation system (34).
This MPEC approach is mathematically equivalent to a nested fixed point strategy in which
the Chebyshev collocation equations (34) are solved exactly for each trial of parameters
ψ. In our simulations, however, we found the MPEC framing to be several times faster
on average. In conjunction with state of the art numeric optimizers such as KNITRO or
IPOPT, and analytic gradients derived from the log-likelihood above, we are ultimately able
to solve the profiled MLE problems with very high efficiency via this MPEC algorithm. In
our simulations, the median profiled MLE problem is solved in less than 5 seconds, and
almost all are solved in less than 10 seconds.
Recall that, for a given vector of equilibrium entry thresholds s ∈ S, the vector φ =
(φ1 , ..., φK ) must belong to an admissible set Φ(s) defined in Section 4. Fixing s ∈ S, Φ(s)
is defined by a collection of linear inequality restrictions on the vector φ, which facilitates
the reflection proposal distribution which we use in blockwise Metropolis-Hastings sampling
of φ, which we describe below. Unfortunately, however, the restrictions defining Φ(s) are
not linear in s. Consequently, when solving the MPEC problem above, which involves joint
search over (s, φ), we need a computationally convenient representation of the unconditional
admissible set Ψ.
We achieve this by introducing a (K − 1)-element vector of auxiliary variables W =
(W2 , ..., WK ) defined by Wk = (1 − sk )/(sk+1 − sk ) ≥ 0 for each k = 2, ..., K. We can then
express Conditions D’, S’, and O’ in the definition of Φ(s) as quadratic inequality constraints
in the vectors φ and W . Furthermore, for each k = 2, ..., K, we can reexpress the definition
of Wk as
Wk (sk+1 − sk ) + sk = 1,
(36)
i.e. a quadratic equality constraint in W and s. We can thus reframe nonlinear, nonquadratic
constraints on (s, φ) as quadratic constraints in (s, φ, W ). This is a significant advantage
for high-performance nonlinear solvers such as KNITRO which are programmed to exploit
simplifications due to quadratic constraints.

Sequential Monte Carlo algorithm for sampling {ψ b }B
b=1
Finally, we describe the Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) algorithm we use for obtaining posterior samples of {ψ b }B
b=1 , the key first step in Procedures 1 and 2 of CCT (2018). SMC
algorithms in general consider particle approximations to the posterior, which associate each
draw ψ b with a sample weight wb . As in CCT (2018), we use an adaptive SMC algorithm
proposed by Herbst and Schorfheide (2014), which starts with draws from the prior and gradually increases weight on the sample log likelihood until targeting the posterior. As in CCT,
this adaptive SMC algorithm has two practical advantages. First, it tends to acheive good
mixing even when the posterior is multi-modal. Second, each iteration of the algorithm involves many highly parallel operations, the SMC algorithm may be run with little additional
computational time.
Each iteration of this adaptive SMC algorithm involves three main steps: Correction,
which updates weights on wb to reflect an increased weight on the sample log-likelihood;
b B
Selection, which resamples {ψ b }B
b=1 according to weights {w }b=1 when weights become too
unequal; and Mutation, which runs B separate and independent MCMC chains starting
from (potentially resampled) {ψ b }B
b=1 and targeting the tempered posterior to obtain starting
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draws for the next iteration. Our implementation of these steps closely follows CCT (2018);
we refer readers to their Appendix A for a detailed explanation. However, some aspects of
our implementation of the MCMC sampler in the mutation step are distinctive. We briefly
describe these next.
Starting from a given parameter draw ψ = (v̄ −1 , γ, φ, s), we obtain a mutated parameter draw ψ 0 by running 4 iterations of the following blockwise Metropolis-Hastings (MH)
algorithm. We consider three core parameter blocks: utility parameters γ, distribution parameters φ, and entry thresholds s. Each MCMC iteration involves three substeps, each
involving update of one block of core parameters along with inverse of maximum valuation
v̄ −1 . We draw new core parameters from the following blockwise proposal distributions.
Utility parameters γ Draw an innovation γ from N (0, Σ̂γ ), then perturb γ 0 = γ + γ ,
with reflection at the boundaries of the feasible set Γ to ensure that γ 0 ∈ Γ. Since
Γ involves only linear inequality constraints, results in Mohasel Afshar and Domke
(2015) imply that the resulting blockwise proposal density qγ for γ satisfies symmetry:
qγ (γ 0 |γ) = qγ (γ|γ 0 ). We thus do not need to account for this density explicitly in
computing the MH acceptance probability.
Distribution parameters φ Draw an innovation φ from N (0, Σ̂φ ), then perturb φ0 =
φ+φ , with reflection at the boundaries of the feasible set Φ(s) to ensure that φ0 ∈ Φ(s).
Since, given s, Φ(s) involves only linear inequality constraints, results in Mohasel Afshar
and Domke (2015) again imply that resulting blockwise proposal density qφ is symmetric
and does not appear explicitly in the MH acceptance probability.
Entry thresholds s Draw an innovation s from N (0, Σ̂s ), then update s0 = s + s . Since
the feasible set for s given other parameters is not affine, we do not employ reflection
in this step. Rather, we simply reject s0 if this leads to ψ 0 ∈
/ Ψ.
In addition, in each block, after proposing a new set of core parameters, we propose a new
candidate v̄ −1,0 from the conditional (tempered) posterior of v̄ −1 given the new proposed
parameters. Thus, for example, in the utility parameter update step, we first draw a new
candidate γ 0 from the proposal density qγ (·|γ). We then draw a new candidate v̄ −1,0 from
qv̄−1 (·|γ 0 , φ, s), a log-linear approximation to the (tempered) posterior density of v̄ −1 given
γ 0 , φ, s. Finally, we accept the new candidates (v̄ −1,0 , γ 0 ) with probability given by the usual
MH acceptance ratio


Π(ψ 0 ) qv̄−1 (v̄ −1 |γ, φ, s) qγ (γ|γ 0 )
,
(37)
Π(ψ) qv̄−1 (v̄ −1,0 |γ 0 , φ, s) qγ (γ 0 |γ)
where the leading term is the ratio of (tempered) posterior distributions and the term in
parentheses is the density of proposing (v̄ −1 , γ) from (v̄ −1,0 , γ 0 ) relative to that of proposing
q (γ|γ 0 )
(v̄ −1,0 , γ 0 ) from (v̄ −1 , γ). Further, by symmetry of qγ , the ratio qγγ (γ 0 |γ) cancels out in this
acceptance probability as noted above.
By redrawing v̄ −1 from its posterior in each proposal block, we ensure that proposed
parameters always yield a maximum predicted bid at least as high as the maximum observed
bid at each competition level, eliminating “wasted” parameter draws where the log-likelihood
is negative infinite. Recalling, as noted above, that we may evaluate the equilibrium bid functions at multiple v̄ −1 without re-solving the differential equation (33), this is a notable computational savings. Furthermore, bearing in mind that the proposal qv̄−1 (·|γ, φ, s) approximates
the conditional density of v̄ −1 given γ, φ, s, the MH acceptance ratio (37) approximates the
ratio of the marginal posteriors of γ relative to γ 0 conditional on other parameters, integrating
out v̄ −1 .
In practice, following CCT, we set blockwise proposal variances in each MCMC update
equal to the estimated variance of the relevant parameters in the previous SMC iteration,
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adjusted by a scale factor to ensure an acceptance rate of approximately 0.35 in each block.
This scale factor is updated adaptively as in CCT; we refer interested readers to their discussion for further details. We run 200 iterations of the tempered SMC iteration with tempering,
followed by a further 20 iterations targeting the true posterior. Through inspection of many
sub-cases, we verify that the average log-likelihood remains stable over these final 20 iterations, indicating that the underlying SMC algorithm has converged to a steady state.
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Figure 1: Pointwise Kullback-Leibler contour sets for λ̃0 (x)
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Notes: Range and scale of λ0 (x) are normalized as if v̄ = 1, to best reflect the shape of the underlying
Bernstein polynomial parameterization. Contour values reflect the inverse order of magnitude of the
pointwise profiled Kullback-Leibler divergence inf ψ∈Ψ {DKL (ψ0 ||ψ) : λ̃(x) = y}, where DKL (ψ0 ||ψ) is
scaled to represent the expected difference in log-likelihood per unit of sample scale. For example,
a contour value above 5.0 implies that there is a parameter vector ψ ∈ Ψ with λ̃(x) = y such that
DKL (ψ0 ||ψ) ≤ 10−5.0 .
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Figure 2: Rejection rates for candidate values of the average slope λ0 (x)/x based on CCT Procedures 2 and 3 in a correctly specified CRRA model with sample scale M = 1000.
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(d) True ρ0 = 0.5, nominal size 0.01

Notes: Rejection rates are estimated based on 100 Monte Carlo simulations. In this CRRA specification,
λ0 (x)/x is point-identified. CCT Procedures 2 and 3 are both efficient. In implementing CCT Procedure
2, we scale DKL (ψ0 ||ψ) to represent the expected difference in log-likelihood per bid observed at each
competition level. We treat two parameter vectors ψ, ψ 0 as numerically equivalent if DKL (ψ||ψ 0 ) ≤ 10−5.0 .
The grey shaded area represents the DKL (ψ||ψ 0 ) ≤ 10−5.0 contour set for λ0 (x)/x obtained at true
parameters ψ0 .
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Figure 3: Power curves for testing risk neutrality (ρ0 = 0) as proposed in Section 4.2 (based on
CCT Procedure 3), as a function of risk aversion ρ and sample scale M
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Notes: Rejection rates are estimated based on 100 Monte Carlo simulations. To render x-axes comparable across panels, we calibrate CARA utility parameters such that λ0 (0.5) = 0.5/(1 − ρ), where ρ is a
pseudo-true CRRA parameter indexed on the x axis. This ensures that the average slope of λ(x) in each
CARA model is similar to the corresponding CRRA model over the interval [0, 0.5], which is roughly the
empirically relevant domain of the argument v − β(v) in λ(v − βk (v)). To isolate the effect of misspecified
λ0 (x), we simulate bidding data under both CARA and CRRA models at CRRA entry thresholds.
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Notes: Estimated based on 100 Monte Carlo simulations. M is the sample scale (i.e., the average number of bids observed at each competition
level). In implementing CCT Procedure 2, we treat two parameter vectors ψ, ψ 0 as numerically equivalent if DKL (ψ||ψ 0 ) ≤ 10−5.0 . The light
grey shaded area in each figure represents the DKL (ψ||ψ 0 ) ≤ 10−5.0 contour set for λ0 (x)/x at true parameters ψ0 , while the dark grey area
represents the DKL (ψ||ψ 0 ) ≤ 10−5.5 contour set. The dashed horizontal line is nominal level α = 0.95, and the solid vertical line is true λ0 (x)/x.
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Figure 4: Estimated average coverage (acceptance) rates for candidate values of λ̃0 (x)/x based on level α = 0.95 confidence sets
derived from CCT Procedure 2, parameterizing λ0 flexibly as a Bernstein polynomial of degree Q = 4.
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Figure 5: Estimated average coverage (acceptance) rates for candidate values of λ̃0 (x)/x based
on level α = 0.95 confidence sets derived from CCT Procedure 2, parameterizing λ0 flexibly as a
Bernstein polynomial of degree Q = 7.
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(d) x = 0.4, ρ0 = 0.0, uniform prior

Notes: Estimated based on 100 Monte Carlo simulations. M is the sample scale (i.e., the average
number of bids observed at each competition level). In implementing CCT Procedure 2, we treat two
parameter vectors ψ, ψ 0 as numerically equivalent if DKL (ψ||ψ 0 ) ≤ 10−5.0 . The light grey shaded area in
each figure represents the DKL (ψ||ψ 0 ) ≤ 10−5.0 contour set for λ0 (x)/x at true parameters ψ0 , while the
dark grey area represents the DKL (ψ||ψ 0 ) ≤ 10−5.5 contour set. The dashed horizontal line is nominal
level α = 0.95, and the solid vertical line is true λ0 (x)/x.
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Table 1: Estimated average coverage probabilities for profiled DKL ≤ 10−5.0 and DKL ≤ 10−5.5
contour sets for λ̃0 (x)/x based on CCT Procedure 2, and median confidence intervals for λ̃0 (x)/x
implied by these confidence sets.
Nominal confidence α = 0.95
ρ0 x
0.5 0.4

0.6

1.0

0.0 0.4

0.6

1.0

Fraction cover DKL
M ≤ 10−5.0 ≤ 10−5.5
500
0.87
0.94
1000
0.95
0.99
2000
0.94
0.99
500
0.84
0.91
1000
0.91
0.91
2000
0.94
0.96
500
0.86
0.91
1000
0.90
0.95
2000
0.89
0.96
500
0.95
0.95
1000
0.95
0.95
2000
0.96
0.96
500
0.92
0.92
1000
0.93
0.93
2000
0.98
0.98
500
0.92
0.92
1000
0.92
0.92
2000
0.96
0.96

Nominal confidence α = 0.99

Median
Fraction cover DKL
Conf Int
≤ 10−5.0 ≤ 10−5.5
[1.151, 3.523]
0.98
0.98
[1.136, 3.220]
0.99
1.00
[1.197, 3.037]
0.99
1.00
[1.295, 5.517]
0.97
0.98
[1.308, 5.100]
0.97
0.98
[1.466, 4.341]
0.98
0.99
[1.251, 6.000]
0.98
0.98
[1.246, 6.000]
0.98
0.98
[1.362, 6.000]
0.97
1.00
[1.000, 1.503]
0.98
0.98
[1.000, 1.400]
0.99
0.99
[1.000, 1.370]
1.00
1.00
[1.000, 1.725]
0.97
0.97
[1.000, 1.528]
0.98
0.98
[1.000, 1.455]
1.00
1.00
[1.000, 3.635]
0.95
0.95
[1.000, 2.879]
0.97
0.97
[1.000, 2.597]
1.00
1.00

Median
True
Conf Int
λ̃0 (x)/x
[1.060, 3.781]
2.0
[1.073, 3.407]
2.0
[1.150, 3.150]
2.0
[1.156, 6.000]
2.0
[1.178, 5.678]
2.0
[1.356, 4.807]
2.0
[1.142, 6.000]
2.0
[1.149, 6.000]
2.0
[1.297, 6.000]
2.0
[1.000, 1.608]
1.0
[1.000, 1.477]
1.0
[1.000, 1.424]
1.0
[1.000, 1.911]
1.0
[1.000, 1.657]
1.0
[1.000, 1.549]
1.0
[1.000, 4.369]
1.0
[1.000, 3.489]
1.0
[1.000, 2.994]
1.0

Notes: Estimates based on 100 Monte Carlo simulations. M is the sample scale (i.e., the average number
of bids observed at each competition level). Columns labeled “Fraction cover DKL ” denotes the fraction
of simulations in which level-α confidence sets based on CCT Procedure 2 cover profiled Kullback-Leibler
contour sets for λ̃0 (x)/x based on DKL (ψ0 ||ψ) ≤ 10−5.0 and DKL (ψ0 ||ψ) ≤ 10−5.5 respectively. Columns
labeled “Median Conf Int” describes the median, across simulations, of lower and upper endpoints for
level-α confidence sets for λ̃0 (x)/x. In implementing CCT Procedure 2, we treat two parameter vectors
ψ, ψ 0 as numerically equivalent if DKL (ψ||ψ 0 ) ≤ 10−5.0 .
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